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Introduction
Speaking to a U.S. Congressional committee in February 2003,
American Medical Association (AMA) president-elect Donald
Palmisano described a medical liability “crisis” bearing down on
physicians.1 Medical malpractice insurance premiums are at
“unprecedented levels,” he said.2 Health centers are closing.3 Patients
are leaving their state to find care.4 Emergency departments are losing
staff.5 Physicians can no longer afford—or even find—liability
insurance necessary to practice.6 This is occurring, Palmisano said,
because “premiums are spiking across all specialties.”7
The concern over premium prices continues today, with
physicians and politicians alike crying foul over what they perceive to
be the escalating and debilitating cost of medical malpractice
insurance. This perception has helped generate the impetus for dozens
of federal and state legislative proposals aiming to curb what many
1.

Assessing the Need to Enact Medical Liability Reform Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th
Cong. 68 (2003) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Donald J.
Palmisano, President-elect, American Medical Association). The AMA
has been one of the main groups that advocates for legal changes to
make it more difficult for injured patients to recover compensation from
physicians in lawsuits and to cap the amount of their compensation if
courts find physicians liable. In advocating for such changes, the AMA
has asserted the following position in public statements and testimony
before Congress: (1) the cost of malpractice insurance has risen steadily
and unabatedly; (2) that high premiums threaten the economic viability
of medical practice and thereby precipitate a crisis; and (3) that
malpractice premiums cause physicians to either stop practicing
medicine or relocate to states solely in order to obtain malpractice
insurance at lower cost.

2.

Id. at 70.

3.

Id.

4.

Id. at 69.

5.

Id. at 70.

6.

Id.

7.

Id. at 71.
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sense are out-of-control costs. In the 108th and 109th U.S. Congresses
alone, twenty-six bills were introduced to address this “rise in
malpractice premiums.”8 These bills sought to change the rules of tort
liability for medicine, to provide tax credits for premiums as relief,
and to establish a commission to investigate the reasons that caused
the rise in premiums, among other actions.9 Palmisano and the AMA
joined with other groups to advocate for such legislation. In fact, the
AMA website even includes a map indicating states in crisis,
testimonials, and articles.10
Many of these bills, however, use caps to limit patient recovery
and physician liability.11 Rather than focusing on the prevalence of
malpractice itself, much of this legislation challenges a patient’s right
to recover and leaves many of these patients vulnerable, especially
those without income, such as the retired, homemakers, and children.
Even if malpractice premiums are indeed high, other less damaging
and more effective options exist with which to counteract high
premiums. They include reducing the incidence of medical injury or
finding other ways to pay for insurance or compensate injured
patients.
“Malpractice lawsuits are the compensation tool that we have,”
wrote Tom Baker in his 2005 book, The Medical Malpractice Myth.12
8.

In the 108th Congress, the bills were H.R. 1116, 108th Cong. (2003);
H.R. 1124, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1158, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R.
321, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 1374, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1178, 108th
Cong. (2003); H.R. 4124, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 446, 108th Cong.
(2003); H.R. 447, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 485, 108th Cong. (2003);
H.R. 1044, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1249, 108th Cong. (2003); and S.
352, 108th Cong. (2003); in the 109th Congress, they were: H.R. 2657,
109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 2400, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 2291, 109th
Cong. (2005); H.R. 2399, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 354, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 367, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 366, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.
2731, 109th Cong. (2005), and S.1012, 109th Cong. (2005). Since then
bills have been introduced to limit damage awards rather than to cap
premiums. See H.R. 5480, 110th Cong. (2008); Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3459, 111th
Cong. (2009); S. 2662, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1734, 111th Cong. (2009);
S. 1099, 112th Cong. (2011); and H.R. 4106, 113th Cong. (2014).

9.

See note 8 supra and accompanying text.

10.

AM. MED. ASSOC., America’s Medical Liability Crisis Map (on file with
the author).

11.

See, e.g., David A. Hyman et al., Do Defendants Pay What Juries
Award? Post-Verdict Haircuts in Texas Medical Malpractice Cases,
1988–2003, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 3, 38 (2007).

12.

TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 111 (2005); for another
leading synthesis on medical malpractice, see FRANK A. SLOAN &
LINDSEY M. CHEPKE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (2008); for a collection of
interesting contemporary analyses, see generally WILLIAM M. SAGE &

165

Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015
Why the Medical Malpractice Crisis Persists Even When Malpractice
Insurance Premiums Fall

“It would be a terrible mistake to make that tool harder to use
without giving people something better in its place.”13 Not only would
this legislation make lawsuits more difficult for plaintiffs, but the bills
do not address the real source of the problems that they intend to
solve. Premiums are not rising as claimed and even if they were, other
factors are contributing to the plight of physicians. As Baker aptly
titled his book, the medical malpractice “crisis” is more myth than
fact.14
Part I of this Article examines how this myth began and the
proposed legislative remedies that it spawned. Part II shows that junk
data has been used to support legislation while introducing more
reliable data bearing on these issues. Part III describes other factors
that are rarely mentioned, but that have important effects on the cost
of medical practice and physician income. If doctors are truly closing
up shop, then malpractice insurance premiums are not the cause. Part
IV then examines one AMA-declared “crisis state” to see if there are
indeed crises in some selected states, even if there is no crisis
nationally. As this Part shows, there are none; rather, the study of
individual states reveals that premiums rise and fall cyclically, that
recent premium increases reflect these cycles, and that rates will
probably fall as they have in the past whenever there has been an
increase in rates. This Article concludes by offering insight into why
physicians continue to perceive a crisis despite the data presented and
what the future may hold for reform.

I. The Perpetual Crisis
The conventional wisdom today suggests that malpractice
premiums are crushing practices and that the appropriate response is
to restrict compensation for injured patients. For example, in 2006,
U.S. Senate leaders introduced the Medical Care Access Protection
Act and the Healthy Babies Access to Care Act in order to reduce the
cost of liability insurance.15 The sponsors of the measure intended to
drive down the cost of premiums by capping malpractice
compensation under the assumption that insurance rates are
increasing.16 To do so, the bills prohibited punitive damage awards
ROGAN KERSH, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
SYSTEM (2006).

AND THE

U.S. HEALTH CARE

13.

BAKER, supra note 12, at 111.

14.

Id.

15.

Medical Care Access Protection Act of 2006, S. 22, 109th Cong. § 8
(2006); Healthy Mothers and Healthy Babies Access to Care Act, S. 244,
110th Cong. §8 (2007).

16.

S. 22; S. 244.
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that in excess of two and a half times the economic loss or $250,000,
whichever is greater.17
To justify such bills, legislators and physicians across the country
depict a devastating scenario: “For years, the price of medical
malpractice insurance has soared to record breaking levels,” said
Representative Juan Hinojosa (Texas) in May 2005.18 “Medical school
students are no longer interested in specialties and sub-specialties
because of the yearly price they must pay to simply practice their
craft.”19 In Illinois, according to the AMA, “it is a simple fact that the
state’s out of control legal system has driven insurance premiums skyhigh and forced high-risk specialists, including neurosurgeons and
obstetrician-gynecologists, to restrict services, retire early and leave
the state. . . . Anyone driving through the state could lose their life
because of this crisis.”20 New York State Senator John Flanagan, who
sponsored legislation in 2008 that would decrease the amount of
liability insurance needed by physicians to practice, stated that
“Malpractice insurance rates are pushing doctors out of our state.”21
In January 2003, U.S. Representative Peter DeFazio proposed a
federal commission to examine the causes of “skyrocketing
malpractice insurance premiums.”22 DeFazio’s home state of Oregon is
one of twenty in a medical liability crisis, according to the AMA.23
Such states, said the AMA, reflect a national trend in which patients
are losing access to care due to physicians retiring early, relocating to
other states, and restricting services, such as no longer delivering
babies or performing high-risk surgeries.24
As it is often argued, all this is occurring because malpractice
insurance premiums are spiking, as they did in the 1970s. During that
time, a flood of state legislation attempted to stem the costs of
insurance through reforms of malpractice liability law. That
17.

S. 22; S. 244.

18.

Rep. Hinojosa Gives Doctors a Break, U.S. FED. NEWS, May 18, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 8130861.

19.

Id.

20.

Press Release, Am. Med. Ass’n ., AMA Applauds President’s Call for
Medical
Liability
Reform
(2005),
http://www.philamedsoc.org/community/Resources/phl%20med%2002_
05.pdf.

21.

Senate Passes Medical Malpractice Insurance Legislation, U.S. STATE
NEWS, Apr. 15, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 9871447.

22.

Emergency Malpractice Liability Insurance Commission Act, H.R. 446,
108th Cong. § 3 (2003).

23.

Press Release, Am. Med. Ass’n., AMA: Together We Can Fix Oregon’s
Medical Liability Crisis (2005) (on file with the author).

24.

Id.
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legislation is now considered largely ineffective, but at the time, it
quelled most concerns about increasing rates.25
Compare the claims of forty years ago to those made in recent
years. The similarities are striking. A group of Long Island physicians
threatened “to treat only emergency patients” unless they received
“reasonably priced” malpractice coverage.26 Anesthesiologists in
California and Ohio declared the same.27 New York physicians claimed
that high premiums were either forcing them to leave the state or
retire early.28 Doctors were not only moving from “heavily populated
cities such as New York and Los Angeles to rural areas,” but also
leaving the country to practice abroad.29 They were fleeing “to other
states where there are fewer malpractice suits, smaller judgments and
thus more reasonable insurance rates.”30
The same panic existed then as it does now. But despite the
ineffective legislation, the increase in rates abated as they are likely to
again. Some physicians actually acknowledge this, noting that
premiums have not increased without pause.31 They point to three
periods of particularly high premiums—1970 to 1975; 1980 to 1990;
and 1996 to the present—yet many physicians now claim that
premiums are now at a breaking point.32 Some data, as will later be
explained, actually suggest that once adjusted for inflation, medical
malpractice premiums actually decreased between 1986 and 2000.33
When Palmisano addressed the U.S. House of Representatives in
2003, he did so in support of the Help Efficient Accessible Low-Cost
Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act.34 This bill, like many before and
after it, suggested reforms to make malpractice insurance more
affordable for physicians.35 “Our healthcare system is facing a crisis,”
Palmisano said, “when community health centers have to reduce their

25.

Frank A. Sloan, Responses to the Malpractice Insurance “Crisis” of the
1970s: An Empirical Assessment, 9 J. HEATH POL. POL’Y & L. 629, 629
(1985).

26.

Malpractice: The State Steps In, TIME, May 5, 1975, at 82.

27.

Id.

28.

Malpractice Mess, TIME, June 9, 1975, at 18.

29.

Malpractice: MDs Revolt, NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1975, at 58.

30.

Id.

31.

Sloan, supra note 25.

32.

Id.

33.

Id.

34.

Hearings, supra note 1, at 76.

35.

H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (2003).
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services or close their doors because of liability insurance concerns.”36
Yet, those concerns are not well founded. So why do they exist?
Those who in recent years claimed that there is an ongoing crisis
base that claim on anecdotes, unsupported assertions, and flawed
data.37 Palmisano and others flouting evidence of rising premium
costs, cite the Medical Liability Monitor Reporter (MLMR).38 For the
last decade, nearly all data in scholarly articles and reports by
government agencies were based on data from the MLMR, which sells
data on malpractice insurance pricing trends.39 It obtains premium
data from various insurance company rate sheets and, based on these
rate sheets, reports average premium increases and decreases and
average rates.40 It generates numbers that sound precise and make for
compelling sources in newspaper or reports.
For example, when the Associated Press detailed Florida’s
“particularly difficult medical malpractice climate” in 2007, it cited
MLMR data.41 The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette did as well when
reporting about, “malpractice fees driving away young doctors” in
2005.42 That same year, the Rochester Democrat and Chronicle
compared the plight of its physicians with those in New Jersey and
Virginia, many of whom “stopped seeing patients to protest too-costly
medical malpractice insurance.”43 It too cited MLMR data,44 as do
many other newspaper articles and trade publications.45 Many

36.

Hearings, supra note 1, at 2.

37.

Marc A. Rodwin, et al., Malpractice Premiums and Physicians’ Income:
Perceptions of a Crisis Conflict with Empirical Evidence, 25 HEALTH
AFF. 750, 757 (2006).

38.

Id. at 750.

39.

MEDICAL LIABILITY MONITOR REPORTER 27 (Aug. 2002) (on file with the
author); see also MEDICAL LIABILITY MONITOR REPORTER 28 (Oct. 2003)
(on file with the author).

40.

Medical Liability Monitor,
(last visited Feb. 26, 2015).

41.

LMS and Best Practices Medical Partners Enter Agreement for CALM
Shoulder Screen Risk Management Tool, PR NEWSWIRE (Aug. 21, 2007),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/lms-and-best-practicesmedical-partners-enter-agreement-for-calm-shoulder-screen-riskmanagement-tool-58318962.html.

42.

See generally, Jacqueline Shoyeb, Study: Pa. Malpractice Fees Driving
Away Young Doctors, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 18, 2005, at
A1, available at 2005 WLNR 11251412.

43.

Joy Davia, Malpractice Insurance Soars, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT &
CHRONICLE, Feb. 25, 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 17961223.

44.

Id.

http://www.medicalliabilitymonitor.com
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scholarly articles on medical malpractice and government reports also
cite MLMR data.46
Even the AMA, despite having its own contradicting evidence,
cites MLMR studies and uses them in support of its proposed
restructuring of medical malpractice law.47 Indeed, the AMA has used
data from the MLMR to support its position on medical liability
insurance premiums. As recently as 2008, for example, the AMA
proclaimed that “tort reforms work,” touting a then-recent analysis of
medical liability and 2007 MLMR data.48 “This tells the story again:
Tort reform works, and this just reaffirms it for the umpteenth time,”
said AMA Immediate Past President William G. Plested, III, in
American Medical News, an AMA publication.49 “In this day and age
of evidence-based medicine, we ought to have evidence-based tort
reform.”50
Compelled by concerns of physicians across the country and
Congressional requests for a report, the U.S. General Accounting
Office (GAO) investigated rising malpractice premium rates and

45.

See generally, Brandon Stahl, High-risk Health Providers Stay in
Business Thanks to State Insurance, STAR TRIBUNE, May 5, 2013,
http://www.startribune.com/local/206125891.html; Darshak Sanghavi,
Medical Malpractice: Why is it so Hard for Doctors to Apologize?,
BOST.
GLOBE,
Jan.
27,
2013,
http://www.bostonglobe.com/magazine/2013/01/27/medicalmalpractice-why-hard-for-doctorsapologize/c65KIUZraXekMZ8SHlMsQM/story.html;
Christopher
Flavelle, Op-Ed, Pay Doctors Less, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec.
14,
2012,
http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/OpEd/2012/12/14/Pay-doctors-less/stories/201212140254; Katharine Q.
Seelye & Andrew Keh, Parent’s Right, or Professional’s Privacy?, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2011, at A14.

46.

See, e.g., Leonard J. Nelson et al., Medical Liability and Health Care
Reform, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 443, 469 (2011); Aaron E. Carroll et al.,
The Impact of Defense Expenses in Medical Malpractice Claims, 40 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 134, 135 (2012); Jessica Wolpaw Reyes & Rene Reyes,
The Effects of Malpractice Liability on Obstetrics and Gynecology:
Taking the Measure of a Crisis, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV. 315, 321 (2012).

47.

See, e.g., Amy Sorrel, AMA Analysis Reaffirms: Tort Reforms Work,
AM.
MED.
NEWS
(Mar.
3,
2008),
http://www.amaassn.org/amednews/2008/03/03/prsa0303.htm.

48.

Id.

49.

See 2002 Rate Survey Finds Malpractice Premiums Are Soaring, MED.
LIABILITY MONITOR, Oct. 2002, at I-IV (on file with the author); AMA
Analysis Reaffirms: Tort Reform Works, AM. MED. NEWS (Mar. 3,
2008),
available
at
http://www.amaassn.org/amednews/2008/03/03/prsa0303.htm.

50.

AM. MED. NEWS, supra note 49.
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possible causes in 2003.51 Rather than obtain its own data, or review
multiple sources of existing data, however, the GAO relied on the
MLMR data and presumed that it showed a crisis.52 The GAO
reported that due to “large increases in medical malpractice insurance
premium rates . . . physicians will no longer be able to afford
malpractice insurance and will be forced to curtail or discontinue
providing certain services.”53
But the MLMR data is not reliable. Industry insiders do not put
much stock in its data, says Stephen Langlois director of
underwriting-actuarial services at the ProMutual Group.54 And for
good reason. MLMR data averages the rates paid by physicians as if
they all purchase the same number of policies from the same insurer.
This skews the data. For example, if MLMR surveys three insurers in
one market and averages their rates, each rate will count for one-third
of the average. But one firm might insure more than half of the
physicians surveyed, a second, only 30 percent, and the third only 10
percent. The MLMR average does not reflect those differences.
Another problem is that the MLMR does not distinguish between
rates for different practice specialties or for different kinds of
insurance policies. That might be acceptable if all physicians paid
more or less the same premium. But in fact, insurance rates vary
based on practice specialty, and the kind of policy coverage that
physicians purchase. As we will see later, most insurers distinguish
between about seven types of policies based on their duration.
Insurance rates also vary depending on the level of liability protection
that physicians purchase. Averages across all policies do not reflect
those differences. In addition, the MLMR reports on insurance rates
that firms file with state regulators, not the actual amount that
physicians pay for insurance. These rates act more like a sticker price
for a car rather than the negotiated and paid amount.
States regulate insurance rates so insurers cannot raise those rates
without state authorization. As a result, insurers seek approval for
high rates to protect their ability to charge that much, but in practice
they discount those policies based on market competition. High rates
allow insurers the flexibility to vary charges based on changing
conditions without having to wait until the next period for rate
51.

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-702, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO
INCREASED PREMIUM RATES 1 (2003) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].

52.

Id. at 9.

53.

Id.

54.

Interview with Stephen Langlois, Director of Underwriting-Actuarial
Services, ProMutual Group (2005).
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increases or without having to take the risk that regulators will not
approve future rate increases.
Insurers also have a competitive advantage by not revealing to
their competitors the actual amounts that they charge customers.
Without that information, competitors do not know how much they
can raise prices without the risk of losing customers. They are also
unaware of the dollar amount by which they need to reduce their
prices in order to attract customers from competing insurers.
Differences between regulated rates and discounted premiums also
make it more difficult for a firm to know the reason that a competitor
offers a physician a lower premium than it otherwise would. The
firm’s competitor might have offered a lower premium because it
believed the physician had a lower risk of loss than the firm’s own
evaluation or the competitor might simply be willing to assume the
physician’s risk of loss for a lower fee than the firm would. In fact,
people working in the medical malpractice insurance industry report
that since 1990, most of them use manual rates as a baseline and vary
the amount they charge individual physicians.55
Yet another concern with the MLMR and most similar
publications is that they usually report the percentage change in
rates, not the actual dollar amount. That can make changes appear
much greater than they actually are when premiums are low. For
example, if insurance rates are $10,000, raising premiums by $2,000 to
$12,000 would be a 20 percent increase. However, a $2,000 increase in
a physician’s premiums does not have a major impact on her practice
viability if the physician’s gross practice revenue is $500,000 and her
total practice expenses are about half of revenue, or $250,000. If other
practice expenses do not change, the physician’s net income would fall
from $250,000 to $248,000. Taking all this into account, it is not
surprising that in recent years some scholars have criticized the
reliability of the MLMR data for tracking premium costs.56

II. Making Sense of Changes in Malpractice Premiums
To understand the effect of changes in malpractice insurance
premiums on a physician’s practice requires a comparison of those
55.

Id.

56.

See, e.g., Kathryn Zeiler et al, Physicians’ Insurance Limits And
Malpractice Payments: Evidence From Texas Closed Claims, 1990-2003,
36 J. LEGAL STUD. s9, s37 (2007). (“[E]mpirical studies that fail to
address policy size may generate findings that are suspect. For example,
the Medical Liability Monitor (MLM), a widely used source of data,
provides pricing information for $1 million primary policies. If many or
most doctors carry policies with different limits, MLM-based studies
may mischaracterize trends in insurance pricing.”).
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premiums to total practice expenses and revenue. First, premiums
paid should be compared to other practice expenses. These expenses
include office rent or mortgage payments, medical equipment and
supplies, non-physicians’ salaries, office utilities, office supplies, and
other overhead expenses. That information is necessary to show the
relation between premiums, other practice expenses, and total practice
expenses.
Second, total practice expenses should be compared to gross
practice revenue. This information shows the relationship between
practice expenses and net practice income. Net practice income equals
gross practice revenue minus total practice expenses before payment
of taxes. Together, this information shows the relative importance of
premiums to other practice expenses.
Even if premiums are escalating, they may not cause the financial
woes that are so often claimed. By considering total practice expenses,
it appears that insurance rates are not the lone culprit—if one at all—
for raising costs of medical practice. A 2011 report by the Medical
Group Management Association, for example, found that general
operating expenses rose nearly 53 percent in the last decade.57 Partly
responsible for that increase were support staff expenditures (4.8
percent) and supply costs (7.4 percent).58
It is also important to distinguish between short term premium
increases or declines and long term trends. Claims such as the ones
made by proponents of tort reform in the beginning of this article give
the impression that rates continue to increase every year and never
decrease. This is not the case. Studies show that they rise and fall in
predictable cycles, just as premiums do for other insurance.59
“Insurance markets cycle through periods of low prices and ample
supply (called soft markets) and periods of high prices and scarce
supply (called hard markets).”60 During soft markets, there are
relatively low claim costs and insurers are more able to lower prices
and attract more business.61 A soft market existed prior to the 1970s,
57.

John Commins, MGMA: Docs Trim Practice Expenses, But Operating
MEDIA
(Sept.
22,
2011),
Costs
Soar,
HEALTHLEADERS
http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/content/LED-271265/MGMADocs-Trim-Practice-Expenses-But-Operating-Costs-Soar#%23.

58.

Id.

59.

Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle,
54 DEPAUL L. REV. 393, 409 (2005); see generally Kurt Karl et al.,
Capital Markets and Insurance Cycles, 4 J. RISK FINANCE 40, 40 (2003).

60.

MICHELLE M. MELLO, THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND.,
UNDERSTANDING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: A PRIMER 12
(2006).

61.

Id.
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before malpractice claims increased, costs of insuring physicians for
liability rose, insurers raised premiums and some insurers dropped out
of the market.62 When a change in the market like this occurs,
however, it typically stabilizes in a few years.63 Hard markets
ultimately soften again, providing a more competitive insurance
market and driving insurance rates back down.
The cycle reflects a forecasting error; that is, the difference
between what insurers thought their losses would be over a short
period of time and what their losses actually were.64 Unlike other
insurance markets, the consequences of a forecasting error can be
severe because claims are often not filed until two to three years after
the alleged malpractice occurs.65 Insurer forecasts consider not only
losses from existing claims, but potential losses from claims that will
be filed in the future.66
Baker examined one such cycle that occurred between 1980 and
2002.67 By plotting the difference in what insurers predicted their
losses to be and what they actually were, a trend emerges that
mirrors the rise and fall of premium rates.68
In 1980, medical malpractice insurers experienced losses higher
than they anticipated, leading to a drop in profits.69 For the next six
years, a hard market continued with declining profits causing insurers
to raise premiums to compensate for the loss in revenue.70 Then the
market turned.71 In 1986, predicted losses exceeded actual losses so
insurers found themselves with more money in their reserves and a
greater profit.72 Insurance premiums began to decrease in price
because insurers could now afford more competitive policies.73 This
soft market continued until 1996, when actual losses began to exceed

62.

BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., 2 HEALTH LAW 349 (2d ed., 1995).

63.

See Mello, supra note 60, at 12.

64.

Id.

65.

Id.

66.

Id.

67.

Baker, supra note 59, at 53.

68.

Id.

69.

Id.

70.

Id.

71.

Id.

72.

Id.

73.

See id. at 57.
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predicted losses again and profits suffered.74 With profits down,
insurance rates again began to rise.75
Other factors that affect the underwriting cycle are fluctuations in
interest rates and the performance of the stock market. The insurance
industry generates income by charging premiums and by investing the
money brought in from premiums. These two main sources of
revenue—premiums and the investment of premiums—allow the
insurance industry to shift dependency between revenue streams. In
periods of high interest rates, it is possible for an insurance company
to rely more heavily on investment income. This exacerbates the
underwriting cycle as the increased investment income derived from
high interest rates further enables an insurance company to write
policies below fair market value. A report by the U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) on medical malpractice premiums found
that a drop in investment income of 1 percent requires a 4 percent
increase in the premium charged to make up for the difference.76
The performance of the stock market affects insurance investment
earnings as well. Industry experts estimate that 15 percent of
insurance company investments are in the stock market.77 When the
stock market is performing well, as it did during the late 1990s,
increased income from stock market investments further enables an
insurance company to write policies below fair market value. When
investment income drops, this exacerbates an upswing in the
underwriting cycle, as rates on premiums must increase, not only to
compensate for past policies written below fair market value, but also
to make up for the reduced income from poor investment
performance. This occurred in the mid-1980s when malpractice
premiums increased dramatically after historically high interest rates
declined and the insurance market then experienced an upswing in the
underwriting cycle.78 Insurance companies were forced to increase
premiums in order to offset both the reduction in revenue from
74.

Id.

75.

RODWIN ET AL., supra note 37, at 755.

76.

GAO REPORT, supra note 51, at 27.

77.

AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations
Comm. on Energy and Commerce U.S. House of Representatives
Hearing on “Pennsylvania Medical Liability Insurance Crisis”
(statement of James Hurley, ACAS, MAAA Chairperson), available at
http://www.actuary.org/files/medmal_10feb03.4.pdf/medmal_10feb03.
4.pdf.

78.

David J. Nye et al., The Causes of the Medical Malpractice Crisis: An
Analysis of Claims Data and Insurance Company Finances, 76 GEO.
L.J. 1495, 1526 (1988); John Conyers, Jr., The Health Act – A Bad
Prescription for Consumers, 27 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 191, 193 (2003).
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investment income and to compensate for the low premiums that had
been charged in the late 1970s and early 1980s.79
The cycles that these rates follow directly rebuke the claims of
skyrocketing premiums. Ironically, there is data that supports all of
this in a study conducted by one of the main parties perpetuating the
medical malpractice myth: the American Medical Association.

III. The AMA National and Regional Surveys
Despite media reports on malpractice insurance relying on
anecdotes or the MLMR, there is a source of comprehensive, detailed,
and reliable data on the amounts that physicians paid for malpractice
insurance.80 Starting in 1970 and continuing annually through 2000,
the AMA surveyed self-employed U.S. physicians on many aspects of
their medical practice.81
Physicians reported malpractice premiums and other expenses as
well as gross practice revenue. The AMA data thus reveals net
practice income (i.e., gross practice revenue minus total practice
expenses) as well as its relation to malpractice premiums.82 The AMA
surveys also identify expenses and revenue by practice specialty,
79.

Conyers, supra note 78, at 193.

80.

The surveys were conducted by the AMA Center for Health Services
Research (1970-1992), Socio-Economic Monitoring System (1992-1999),
and the Patient Center Physician Survey (2000). The AMA published
this data in numerous publications, some of which reported data for one
year only and others reported data for more than one year. There was
often a lag between when the data was collected and when the AMA
published reports analyzing the data. Unless otherwise provided, all
figures (1-10) in Part III of this article rely on AMA data from one or
more of the follow data sources. 1970 data from AM. MED. ASS’N,
PROFILE OF MEDICAL PRACTICE (S. G. Vahovich ed., 1973); 1986 data
from AM. MED. ASS’N, PHYSICIAN MARKETPLACE STATISTICS 1978-1998
(M. L. Gonzalez & P. Zhang eds., 1999); AM. MED. ASS’N, PHYSICIAN
MARKETPLACE STATISTICS (M. L. Gonzalez ed., 1988); 1996 data from
AM. MED. ASS’N, PHYSICIAN SOCIOECONOMIC STATISTICS 1997-1998 (M.
L. Gonzalez & P. Zhang eds., 1998); and 2000 data from AM. MED.
ASS’N, PHYSICIAN SOCIOECONOMIC STATISTICS 2000-2002 (J. D.
Wassenaar & S. L. Thran eds., 2003) [hereinafter AMA SURVEYS].

81.

These AMA surveys collected data from self-employed physicians who
were engaged in solo or group practice, which in 2000 represented 61.5%
of practicing physicians in the United States.

82.

The AMA surveys report a wide variety of data. It consistently reported
national mean values for practice expenses, and practice revenue for all
physicians and for practice specialties. It frequently reported values for
the median, 25th percentile and 7th percentile of physicians nationally.
Also, in reporting on regional trends the AMA reported income for all
physicians but not for various practice specialties.
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location, physician age, physician gender, and other variables. The
surveys include a large enough sample to yield reliable data on trends
not only nationally, but within different practice specialties and
within nine regions.83
Combining data from the AMA’s annual reports reveals patterns
over time. It can show whether the correlation between premiums and
total practice expenses are about the same or whether they have
changed. Since the AMA surveys ran from 1970 to 2000, they reveal
both short-term and long-term changes as well as any premium cycles
within that period. This is important because short-term trends may
reveal a different picture than that of a longer term spanning 30
years.
When the AMA advocates for malpractice law change, it is
ignoring its own studies. Still, researchers in government and
universities consider the AMA practice surveys the gold standard for
information on U.S. physicians. The U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services and other agencies have relied on this data as have
economists, health services researchers, and other scholars. For
example, the Medicare Physician Payment Review Commission
(PPRC), the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC)
and the Department of Health and Human Services Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) have all used this data to
determine changes in practice expenses (including malpractice
premiums) and to revise Medicare physicians’ fee-schedules.84 When
the AMA ended its surveys in 2000, the Medicare program simply
adjusted the data for inflation and re-estimated current practice
expenses.85
A.

Adjusting for Inflation

Comparing income and expenses over time can be misleading if
not adjusted for inflation. Older readers of this article will remember
when candy bars cost a nickel and Coke cost a dime. Comparing the
cost of Coke and candy bars then and now does not reveal real price
increases unless they are also compared to price increases of other
items. Prices generally rise or fall over time for most goods and
services. To learn whether an item costs more now than in the past in
83.

The AMA samples were consistently large with small standard
deviations. For instance, in 2000, the AMA sample was based on 1,900
completed questioners.

84.

See generally Jean M. Mitchell et al., Physicians’ Responses to Medicare
Fee Schedule Reductions, 38 MED. CARE 1029, 1029 (2000).

85.

Medicare Program: Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician
Fee Schedule, 68 Fed. Reg. 63196, 63240 (Nov.7, 2003) (to be codified at
42 C.F.R. pts. 410 & 414).
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real terms, one needs to distinguish overall price increases from those
of the particular item. Economists and statisticians have developed
measures that do just that. The Consumer Price Index (CPI)
measures inflation for a basket of general consumer goods. One can
compare prices from 1970 to 2000 by using the CPI and convert those
prices from different years into inflation-adjusted prices for a single
year. Here we will report all the AMA data adjusted by the CPI for
the year 2005.86
Some researchers think that it is more accurate to use a medical
inflation index to compare malpractice premiums over time because
studies have shown medical expenses increase much more rapidly than
prices overall, generally twice the rate of the consumer price index.87
However, the most accurate way to measure premium increases is to
construct a measure that reflects both the CPI and the medical
inflation index but more heavily weighted toward the CPI.
Malpractice premiums are used to finance court awards or out of
court settlements for physicians who are liable for patient injuries.
Such liability includes paying for the injured patient’s lost income, the
expenses that patients incur due to the injury (such as home care and
medical equipment), and the medical costs related to the patient’s
injury. Court judgments and awards may also compensate patients for
pain and suffering, and they may also provide punitive damages,
which is essentially a fine against the physician for engaging in
reprehensible conduct rather than merely acting negligently. Some of
these costs such as lost income are accurately reflected by the CPI.
Settlement awards for pain and suffering are frequently a fixed
multiple of lost income, typically three times the amount. Since the
costs also reflect lost income, CPI also appropriately adjusts them for
inflation. Medical expenses, and perhaps home care, however, are
probably items best estimated by the medical inflation index rather
than the CPI since they are items that tend to increase at the higher
medical inflation rate.
86.

All dollar figures in this article are expressed in 2005 dollars. We chose
to report 2005 dollars because one of the two principle studies from
which data is drawn is expressed in 2005 dollars. By reporting the data
in 2005, it is easier to compare our numbers with the other published
studies. Readers interested in converting the values that we report in
2005 dollars to 2015 dollars, can do so by multiplying it by 1.20. They
can obtain a CPI index calculator online that will make the conversion
for them for any year they choose. See CPI Inflation Calculator,
BUREAU
OF
LABOR
STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Feb. 27,
2015).

87.

See Bernard Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice
Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1988–2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207,
230 (2005).
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For purposes of this article, premiums are adjusted by the CPI
rather than the medical inflation index since there is no index that
averages CPI and medical inflation. The CPI is likely to show greater
premium increases than the medical inflation index. Since our
preliminary analysis of the data found that premiums increased much
less than is usually supposed, we wanted to make sure that our
methodological choices are not the cause of this unexpected result.
We therefore chose the inflation measure that is more likely to
exaggerate premium increases.
B.

Key AMA Survey Findings

The surveys reveal four key points: (1) malpractice premiums
were always a small portion of total practice expenses; (2) mean
malpractice premiums grew modestly over a 30-year span; (3) during
that time, other practice expenses increased sharply; and (4) gross
practice revenue and net practice income increased from 1975 until
1996, then declined modestly until 2000.
From 1970 to 2000, mean premiums increased modestly for all
physicians nationally. But rather than increase steadily, they rose,
then fell, and then rose again, thus creating a cycle. Malpractice
premiums increased from 1970 until 1986, then declined until 1996
while remaining higher than they were in 1970. Premiums then
increased from 1996 until 2000, but were then lower than at their
peak in 1986.
Throughout the 30 years, malpractice premiums always
represented a small share of total practice expenses. Other practice
expenses—including office rent or office building mortgage payments,
medical equipment and medical supplies, non-physician salaries, office
expenses and utilities88—rose steadily from 1970 to 2000 instead of
rising and falling cyclically. These expenses increased by a much
larger dollar amount than premiums for the whole period and they
surged from 1986 to 2000, years during which premiums declined. As
a result, premiums decreased as a percentage of total practice
expenses from 1986 to 2000, due in part to declining premium rates
and in part due to the surging increases in other practice expenses.
Figure 1(a) shows this 30-year trend for all variables and Figure 1(b)
shows the trend for malpractice premiums alone with a different scale
to make clear small changes that are not visible in Figure 1(a).89
88.

The AMA did not report details on practice expenses for individual nonpremium expenses in most years. I reported all the details on such
individual expenses that I found in the AMA surveys.

89.

Data drawn from the AMA surveys as reported in several AMA
publications. The data was first analyzed for an article in Health Affairs
where it was reported in constant 2000 dollars. In this article all this
data has been reported in constant 2005 dollars so that it is comparable
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Figure 1(a). Mean gross revenue, non-premium expenses, malpractice
premiums, and net practice income for all self-employed physicians nationally,
1970-2000.

Note: Data adjusted by Consumer Price Index and expressed in constant 2005
dollars.
Figure 1(b). Mean malpractice premiums for all self-employed physicians
nationally, 1970-2000.

Note: Data adjusted by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and expressed in
constant 2005 dollars.

to the second source of data that I analyze, which was originally
reported in constant 2005 dollars. See Marc A. Rodwin et al.,
Malpractice Premiums in Massachusetts, a High-Risk State: 1975 to
2005, 27 HEALTH AFF. 835, 837 (2008).
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The dollar change in premiums over the 30-year span increases,
falls, and then increases again in a cycle, but it still increases in total.
Premiums are not large, even at the high points of the premium cycle.
Mean premiums increased $14,138 from 1970 to 2000, or $472 per
year. Premiums declined by $122 per year from their 30-year height in
1986 to 2000, and at that point were $1,935 lower than at their
height.
When the AMA and media again proclaimed a malpractice crisis
in 2000, mean premiums were $20,900. Of course, the mean values
represent the central tendency and individual physicians paid different
amounts. Other statistics show variations in the amount physicians
paid. The median premium was $12,500, meaning that half of all
physicians paid less than $12,500 and half paid more.
This, according to the AMA, is a crisis. Citing several sources,
including its own survey of medical students, the AMA published a
report in 2013 detailing what the AMA considered to be an ongoing
liability crisis since the mid-2000s.90 At this time, according to the
report, “45 percent of hospitals reported that the professional liability
crisis resulted in the loss of physicians or reduced coverage in
emergency departments.”91 The “lack of affordable liability insurance”
forced 70 percent of OB/GYNs to make changes to their practice and
forced 7 to 8 percent of them to stop practicing altogether.92 Further,
the AMA claimed that medical students are so concerned with their
potential liability that many are deciding to avoid high-risk specialties
thus contributing to a shortage of physicians in much-needed
practices.93
Granted, in 2000, 25 percent of physicians paid $22,700 or more
in premiums. But is this really a high amount to pay? So high that
doctors are ending their practices en masse and medical students are
avoiding certain specialties simply based on the risk associated with
practice in that particular specialty? If physicians could cut out
$18,400 in premium expenses, then that would certainly improve their
bottom line and increase their income. But malpractice premiums are
a cost of doing business, one which lawyers and other professionals
also pay. Of course, malpractice premiums could be less; yet, they
cannot be eliminated without removing liability for physicians that
are negligent or failing to compensate patients when injured by
physician negligence.

90.

AM. MED. ASS’N, MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM – NOW! 10 (2013).

91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93.

Id.

181

Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015
Why the Medical Malpractice Crisis Persists Even When Malpractice
Insurance Premiums Fall

The larger question is this: How do malpractice premiums affect
both the cost of running a medical practice and the net practice
income? To determine if premiums are a burden on practice
profitability, consider the relationship between malpractice premiums
and other practice expenses displayed in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Mean malpractice premiums, non-premium expenses, and total
practice expenses for all self-employed physicians nationally, 1970-2000
including dollar changes for selected periods.

Note: Data adjusted by the CPI and expressed in constant 2005 dollars.

Annual mean medical malpractice premiums were consistently a
small fraction of total practice expenses. Premiums ranged from
$6,730 to $22,803, while total practice expenses ranged from $122,319
to $279,680. From 1970 to 2000, mean premiums increased $14,139
while non-premium expenses increased $143,223.94
Again, the changes were not uniform over the entire survey
period. Malpractice premiums declined, from 1986 to 1996, while
spending on other practice expenses increased substantially. Nonpremium expenses increased from $188,127 to $253,349, by $65,222, or
34 percent. Office expenses increased from $50,772 to $64,489 or 27
percent; and non-physician personnel expenses increased from $69,148
to $4,243 or 36 percent. Spending on rent, medical equipment, and
supplies, furniture, and utilities also increased sharply.95
The ratio of premiums to total practice expenses are displayed in
Figure 3. The dollar figures are for total practice expenses.

94.

From 1986 to 2000, total mean premiums declined by $1,935 while total
non-premium expenses increased $70,584.

95.

The AMA distinguished between office expenses and furniture, supplies
and utilities. The AMA included items other than these for office
supplies.
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Malpractice premiums as a percentage of total expenses are shown on
the top of each bar.
Figure 3. Mean medical malpractice premiums and non-premium expenses
for self-employed physicians surveyed by the AMA, selected years 1970-2000.

Note: Mean total expenses are shown in the bar graph. Data adjusted by the
CPI and expressed in constant 2005 dollars.

Malpractice premiums represented 6 percent of total practice
expenses in 1970 and 1996, the two years when premiums represented
the smallest share of total practice expenses. In 1986, premiums
comprised 11 percent of total practice expenses, the highest
percentage in the survey. But by 2000, premiums as a percentage of
total practice expenses dropped to 7 percent, hardly more than their
lowest point in the survey.
Consider now how premium increases affected net practice
income. Figure 4 uses bar charts to compare gross practice revenue,
malpractice premiums, non-premium expenses, and net practice
income in 1970, 1986, 1996, and 2000. Figure 5 displays the dollar
amount for these variables and the dollar changes for each variable in
three periods.
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Figure 4. Mean practice revenue, non-premium expenses, malpractice
premiums and net practice income for all self-employed physicians nationally,
1970-2000.

Note: Data adjusted by Consumer Price Index and expressed in constant 2005
dollars.

In reviewing practice expenses, keep in mind that mean net
practice income increased from $211,535 in 1970 to $260,287 in 2000,
representing a total increase of $48,752, or $1,625 per year over 30
years. When premiums increased between 1970 and 1986, they had
only a small effect on net income. While premiums increased by
$16,073, that increase was only a fraction of the $72,538 increase for
non-premium expenses; and despite increases in total practice
expenses, net income increased by $22,019. When premiums declined
$1,935 from 1986 to 2000, non-premium expenses increased by
$70,686.
From 1996 to 2000, physicians’ net practice income fell nationally.
This was primarily due to decreased gross practice revenue. Revenue
decreased $4,817 per year during that four-year period, which is
nearly six times as great as the $829 premium increase per year
during that same period. Also, between 1996 and 2000, non-premium
expenses increased $1,366 per year.
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Figure 5. Mean gross practice revenue, non-premium expenses, malpractice
premiums and net practice income, 1970-2000 including the dollar change for
each variable and selected periods.

Note: Data adjusted by the CPI and expressed in constant 2005 dollars.

The data on mean premiums for physicians nationally and across
practice specialties does not support claims of a premium crisis
around the year 2000. If there was a crisis, it appeared to be around
1986, the peak year for premiums. But even then, premiums were a
small part of total practice expenses. No doubt physicians felt a
financial pinch, but it was not because of the premiums they paid.
When compared to other expenses, premiums were not the dire
problem as described by many physicians and politicians.
C.

A Crisis Within Selected Practice Specialties?

Might some medical specialties face a premium crisis not reflected
in average rates for all physicians? In theory it is possible, but the
data do not show this to be the case.
Specialties paying the highest premiums include obstetrics,
neurosurgery, orthopedics, and until 1990, anesthesiology. The AMA
reports data for all of these specialties except neurosurgery, which was
still developing as a practice specialty when the surveys began in 1970
and is thus not included as a practice category in the data. A review
of the AMA data shows that the specialty with the highest premiums
is Obstetrics/Gynecology (OB/GYN) followed by orthopedic surgery.
The specialties with the highest premiums are most likely to
experience a crisis, so let us look at the at the AMA data to see if
they did.
Figure 6 uses a line graph to display the relationship among gross
revenue, non-premium expenses, premiums, and net practice income
nationwide for OB/GYNs from 1970 to 2000. Figure 7 displays the
dollar values for these variables and the dollar value of change for
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three periods. Figure 8 shows as a bar graph the relation among gross
practice revenue, non-premium expenses, premiums and net practice
income in three periods.
OB/GYNs reflect the basic trend of all physicians in terms of
premiums paid, premium cycles, and total practice expenses. Their
premium rates increased moderately over thirty years while nonpremium expenses increased sharply. Premiums for OB/GYNs—the
highest of any specialty—were always a small fraction of total
practice expenses; they were as low as 8 percent of total practice
expenses in 1970 and as high as 20 percent in 1986. Premiums fell
thereafter until 1996 and then increased until 2000 when they
comprised 13 percent of total practice expenses or $44,459. From 1986
to 2000, OB/GYN premiums decreased $7,739 or $553 per year while
non-premium practice expenses increased $91,970 or $6,569 per year.
Despite having the highest malpractice premiums, OB/GYN net
mean practice income was consistently higher than mean net
physician income. Although OB/GYN net income decreased from its
high of $302,401 in 1996, it was $275,484 in 2000 when mean practice
income for all physicians was $260,287. Malpractice premiums did not
appear to create an OB/GYN crisis.
Figure 6. Mean gross revenue, non-premium expenses, malpractice premiums
and net practice income for all self-employed OB/GYNs nationally, 19702000.

Note: Data adjusted by the CPI and expressed in constant 2005 dollars.
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Figure 7. Mean gross revenue, non-premium expenses, malpractice premiums
and net practice income for all self-employed OB/GYNs nationally, 1970-2000
including the dollar change for each variable and for selected periods.

Note: Data adjusted by the CPI and expressed in constant 2005 dollars.
Figure 8. Mean practice revenue, non-premium expenses, malpractice
premiums and net practice income for all self-employed OB/GYNs nationally,
1970-2000.

Note: Data adjusted by the CPI and expressed in constant 2005 dollars.

D.

A Crisis Among Physicians Paying Higher Than Mean Premiums?

A review of data for the 75th percentile shows that premiums
were no greater a share of total expenses for physicians within that
top quartile than for the mean. In 2000, premiums represented either
the same percentage of total expenses at the 75th percentile as at the
mean or a lower percentage of total expenses. This is true both as a
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whole nationally and specifically for OB/GYNs. In 1986 and 1996, the
relationship among these variables was similar; median values were
within two points of the mean for all physicians and within three
points for OB/GYNs.
Expressed in 2005 dollars, median premiums in 2000 were $12,476
with the top quartile of physicians paying $22,683 or more. If these
physicians had other practice expenses and revenue that were in the
top quartile, their higher premiums would not have resulted in lower
net practice income than most physicians; indeed, net practice income
for the top quartile of physicians was at or above $340,244.
But physicians who paid higher than mean premiums while also
having other expenses and net revenue at the mean level would have
had lower than mean net income. For example, consider a physician
who, in 2000, generated median revenue and had median nonpremium practice expenses while paying premiums at the 75th
percentile for self-employed physicians, $22,683. This physician would
pay $10,207 more in premiums than the median of $12,476. As a
result, this physician’s net income would decrease from the median of
$226,829 to $216,622. Although that physician would earn less that
many others, there still does not appear to be an excessive burden
imposed by the premium costs.
E.

A Crisis Within Specific Regions?

It is possible that there are regional premium crises that are not
reflected in national data because the national data simply averages
all regions together. Many factors affect the local cost of premiums.
For instance, state insurance regulations can affect premiums. State
laws, medical practice, and even culture can affect the rate of
negligent practice, the propensity of individuals to bring suits, and
the amount of awards. Groups advocating legislation that caps the
amount of money patients can recover say that legislation will reduce
malpractice practice premiums, and consequently, the size of awards.
About half of U.S. jurisdictions have some sort of caps on malpractice
awards, so these states may have lower premiums than states without
caps.96
Of those states without caps, some are currently considering
legislation that would reduce the size of awards, and consequently,
the price of premiums. Hawaii legislators, for example, proposed a bill
that would limit non-economic damages in medical tort actions,
96.

Kenneth E. Thorpe, The Medical Malpractice ‘Crisis’: Recent Trends
and the Impact of State Tort Reforms, 2004 HEALTH AFF. W4-20, W4-26
(2004); see also Medical Liability/Medical Malpractice Laws, NAT’L
CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURE (Aug. 15, 2011), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/medicalliability-medical-malpractice-laws.aspx.
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contingent on insurers capping their premium rates.97 The legislation,
which was not enacted, would have limited all non-economic damages
in medical tort actions to a maximum award of $500,000. Meanwhile,
Virginia legislators have questioned whether their current cap on
medical liability is low enough to adequately deter defensive
practices.98
National data does not necessarily reflect these efforts to limit
liability, but instead provides statistics representing an average of all
states. There is potential for those states with escalating premiums to
overshadow the many more states with more reasonable rates or
statutory limits on liability. Perhaps, one may argue, if not a national
crisis, there exists a regional one. Unfortunately, AMA publications
do not include state specific data, probably because the sample size
was not large enough to yield reliable statistics for each state. But the
surveys do include data for nine regions. Figure 9 displays regional
and national mean dollars for all variables from 1986 to 2000. It also
shows premiums as a percentage of these variables.

97.

H.R.
2754
(Haw.
2010),
available
http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/session2010/Bills/HB2754_.html.

at

98.

H.R.
Res.
14,
2010
Sess
(Va.
2010),
available
http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?101+ful+HJ14.

at
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Figure 9. Self-employed physicians: regional variations in mean malpractice
premiums, total expenses, net income; premiums as a percentage of total
expenses and new income, selected years 1986-2000.
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1996 211.1 8% 248.7 9% 262.8 8% 275.3 5%
2000 298.7 5% 267.3 10% 291.2 7% 223.2 8%

211 11%
270.9 6%
280.1 7%

Net Income
1986 206 9% 222.3 12% 251.6
1996 242.1 6% 288 8% 285.4
2000 222.1 7% 229.3 11% 241.7

233.5 10%
288.3 6%
260.3 8%

South
East South
Atlantic
Central
$A %B $A %B
Medical Malpractice Premiums
18
1986 25.6 15.7
1996 16.2 23.3
2000 21.4 -

9% 229.7 11%
7% 313.9 5%
9% 236.4 7%

West South
Central
$A %B
14.4
14.3
17.7

-

Mountain

Pacific

National

$A

%B

$A

%B

$A

21.3
18.7
21.8

-

22.8
14.7
16.7

-

22.8
17.6
20.9

%A

Total Expenses
1986 233.1 11% 236.9
1996 325.3 5% 298.7
2000 280.9 8% 296.1

8%
5%
8%

247.5
266.9
269.2

6% 186.3 11% 209.5 11% 211 11%
5% 278.9 7% 247.1 6% 270.9 6%
7% 264.6 8% 297.3 6% 280.1 7%

Net Income
1986 239.4 11% 250.3
1996 294.2 6% 335.9
2000 230.9 9% 258.4

7%
5%
9%

249.7
299.9
256.5

6% 208.8 10% 225.7 10% 233.5 10%
5% 295.1 6% 262.2 6% 288.3 6%
7% 223.8 10% 215.6 8% 260.3 8%

Note: Data adjusted by Consumer Price Index to constant 2005 dollars.
$A: Thousand dollars;
%B: Premiums as a percentage of the variable (total expenses, net income, or
revenue) in the year shown in column 1.
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The nine regions reflected national trends with only slight
variations.99 Premiums decreased between 1 and 41 percent in the
regions from 1986 to 1996, then increased until 2000 in all regions
except New England. Premiums in 2000 were less than 1986 levels in
six regions and above those levels in three regions. The highest
increases were in the East South Central region.
In 2000, premiums were highest in the Middle Atlantic. At
$26,300, this was $5,400 more than the national mean. But Middle
Atlantic premiums were then less than in 1986 and represented less
than 10 percent of total practice expenses. In 2000, physician net
income in the Middle Atlantic region was $253,400, nearly $7,000 less
than the national mean of $260,300. Three regions with premiums
lower than the Middle Atlantic region, however, had lower net
income—New England, Mountain and Pacific.
Nationally, premiums constituted 11 percent of total practice
expenses at their height in 1986 and 6 percent in 1996, when at their
lowest. Premiums ranged within regions from 14 percent of expenses
in 1986 in the Middle Atlantic to 5 percent of expenses in 2000 in
New England. Though the data does not provide a complete picture
of potential regional crises, the most telling statistic may be the
following: Regional premiums as a percentage of total practice
expenses were never more than 3 points higher than the national
mean in any of the years surveyed.
F.

Can AMA Data Be Interpreted to Suggest a Crisis Exists?

Premium increases since 1996 must be considered in light of
premium decreases for the 14 preceding years prior to 2000. Rates
were lower in 2000 than in 1986 for all physicians nationally, for
OB/GYNs (the highest premium practice specialty) and for the
Middle Atlantic Region (the highest premium region).
Nonetheless, viewed impartially and uncritically, the AMA data
can support the perception that premium increases resulted in a
decline in physician income. The surveys show that while premiums
increased by $3,314 from 1996 to 2000, many physicians’ income
declined.100 These trends alone might lead casual observers to conclude
that premium increases actually caused the income decline.
99.

The New England region: Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont,
Maine; the Pacific region: California, Oregon and Washington; the
Mountain region: Montana, Idaho, Colorado, Wyoming; the Middle
Atlantic region: New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware; the
East North Central region: Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin; the West
North Central region: Minnesota; the South Atlantic region: Florida; the
East South Central region: Louisiana, Mississippi; and the West South
Central region: Texas.

100. Supra Figure 2.
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Armed with this anecdotal evidence, the national media ran with
that story for several years. “Dr. David Snyder is calling it quits,”
began a 2003 article in the Pittsburgh Business Times.101 “After
practicing in Beaver County for 12 years, the escalating malpractice
premiums have forced the 55-year-old general surgeon to an abrupt
stop.”102 Said Snyder, “I can’t ignore the economics of my
situation.”103
Despite some doctors’ difficulties, a different economic picture
emerges when other data are examined. From 1996 until 2000, nonpremium expenses increased for physicians nationally by $5,463.104
Furthermore, mean gross practice revenue declined for physicians
nationally by $19,269.105 As a result, net practice income fell by
$28,046.106 It was declining revenue combined with increasing nonpremium expenses that caused the overwhelming share of declining
net practice income—not malpractice premiums. Increasing insurance
rates were responsible for at most 12 percent of the decline in net
income—in many cases, much less.
The situation is similar, if not more dramatic, for OB/GYNs.
From 1996 to 2000, OB/GYN mean premiums increased by $636, but
non-premium expenses increased by $17,399.107 Increases in nonpremium expenses were more than 27 times the size as increase in
premiums. During this period, gross practice revenue also decreased
by $8,882. As a result, increasing malpractice premiums constituted
less than 2.5 percent of the decline in net income.
In the Middle Atlantic Region, from 1996 to 2000, mean
premiums increased by $4,200 but non-premium expenses increased
even more, by $14,400.108 Gross practice revenue also decreased by
$34,600. Here too, decreases in gross practice revenue and increases in
non-premium expenses accounted for the overwhelming share of
decreased net practice income. Increased malpractice premiums
accounted for just under 12 percent of decreased physician income.

101. Maria Simbra, Disappearing Doctors – The High Cost of Rising
Malpractice Premiums, PITTSBURGH BUSINESS TIMES (Jan. 27, 2003),
http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/stories/2003/01/27/focus4.html
?page=all.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Supra Figure 2.
105. Supra Figure 5.
106. Supra Figure 5.
107. Supra Figure 7.
108. Supra Figure 9.
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In summary, although the AMA and many physicians might
blame premiums for their declining income from 1996 to 2000, the
overwhelming share of falling net practice income came through the
combination of declining gross practice revenue and increasing nonpremium expenses.
Why did physician revenue decline? The AMA data cannot
answer that question. Separate studies suggest that third-party payers
reduced physician fees and made physicians bear financial risk for the
volume of services they supplied or recommended.109 Writing in 1992,
Gregory Pope and John E. Schneider, economists at the Center for
Health Economics Research in Waltham, Massachusetts, wrote,
“Rapid physician income growth in the 1980s suggests that it would
not impose a financial hardship, on average, for physicians to
contribute to federal deficit reduction through lower Medicare fees.”110
In fact, Medicare did reduce physician payment.
Insurers appear to have reduced the volume of services that
physicians performed by employing managed care techniques such as
requiring authorization for elective surgery, limiting access to
specialists and other utilization management techniques. By reducing
the volume of services which physicians would be reimbursed, they
reduced physician income.
109. A report by the Center for Studying Health System Change reveals that
between 1995 and 2003 physician net income from medical practice
declined 7% after adjusting for inflation and that the major factor was
“flat or declining fees from public and private payers.” HA T. TU &
PAUL B. GINSBURG, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, LOSING
GROUND: PHYSICIAN INCOME, 1995-2003 3 (2006). A study by professor
Carol Simon, University of Illinois, and Patricia Born, an economist at
the American Medical Association Center for Health Policy Research,
shows that physician income declined from 1993 to 1994. They state
that the “[d]ata . . . are generally consistent with the hypothesis that
managed care shifted the demand for physician services toward primary
care providers while reducing utilization, fees, or both to physicians.”
Carol J. Simon & Patricia H. Born, Physician Earnings in a Changing
Managed Care Environment, 15 HEALTH AFF. 124, 127 (1996). The role
of physician risk sharing and capitation is noted in Carol J. Simon &
David W. Emmons, Physician Earnings at Risk: An Examination of
Capitated Contracts, 16 HEALTH AFF. 120, 120 (1997); see also Marsha
R. Gold et al., A National Survey of the Arrangements Managed-Care
Plans Make with Physicians, 333 NEJM 1678, 1678 (1995).
110. Gregory C. Pope & John E. Schneider, Trends in Physician Income, 11
HEALTH AFF. 181, 191 (1992) (finding that “physicians’ real income rose
handsomely in the late 1980s.”) Id. at 184. The authors concluded that
the “[p]rovision of more services and higher profit per service
contributed roughly equally to physician income growth in the 1980s.”
Id. at 188. The authors found that between 1982 and 1988, 42% of the
growth of income was due to increased services and that 58% due to
higher unit-profit margin. Id. at 188.
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While the AMA surveys may startle many readers because they
contradict the statements of the AMA political campaigns to cap
malpractice premiums, other AMA reports show that the AMA
accepts the findings of its surveys, even though it takes a different
stance in public. For instance, a 2002 AMA report stated that
“average premiums across all specialties and geographical regions
declined from $15,900 in 1988 to $13,800 in 1992, and then rose to a
new high of $16,800 in 1998.”111 However, the report continued by
adding, “in inflation adjusted dollars, malpractice premiums declined
30.3% between 1988 and 1998.”112
Unfortunately, the AMA ended its surveys in 2000. What then
can be said about premiums since then? The AMA surveys reveal
cyclical premium increases and decreases since 1970, rather than
steady increases. There is no reason to believe that the short-term
premium increases that began in 1996 will not later decline or that
they will affect the long-term cyclic trends previously identified.
Furthermore, the AMA surveys are in line with other reliable
data. Information published by the federal government to explain the
basis of its Medicare physician fee-schedule indicates that, despite
increases in malpractice premiums after 2000, premiums as of midyear 2003 remained a small fraction of total practice expenses.
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), which
administers Medicare, adjusts physician payment periodically based
on changes in practice costs and other variables. At least in this
respect, claims of burdensome premium payments are less credible
when CMS explicitly adjusts fees to account for changes in the cost of
medical malpractice insurance. In addition, the amounts that
Medicare pays physicians are adjusted regionally to account for
differences in malpractice premiums and other costs.
The basis for CMS’s conclusions on malpractice premiums,
additional practice costs, and other aspects of its proposed fee
schedule are published in the Federal Register. Affected parties can
comment on the proposed fee schedule. Because the fee schedule is
important for Medicare payments and because private insurers also
use the fee schedule as a model, professional medical groups submit
detailed comments. CMS must take account of comments on its
proposed fee schedule in promulgating a final Medicare fee schedule.
CMS publishes responses to comments that explain the basis for its
111. AMERICAN MED. ASSOC., AMA COUNCIL ON MEDICAL SERVICES, CMS
REPORT 12: LIABILITY INSURANCE PREMIUMS (2002) (noting the number
in this AMA document are as reported and have not been converted in
2005 dollars) (on file with the author).
112. Id. (emphasis added).

194

Health Matrix·Volume 25·2015
Why the Medical Malpractice Crisis Persists Even When Malpractice
Insurance Premiums Fall

final decision. If CMS does not adequately respond to any criticism
via these comments, affected parties can sue the agency in federal
court. If a court finds that the CMS fee schedule is arbitrary and
capricious or against the weight of evidence, the court can overturn
the fee-schedule.
In the fall of 2003, CMS revised the weights that it uses to
determine the cost of medical practice for the Medicare fee-schedule
to take effect in January 2004. CMS revised the fee schedule to take
account of data on increased medical malpractice premiums through
mid-year 2003.113 It also projected additional premium increases into
2004.114
In proposing another revision of physician fees in July 2007 to
take effect the following year, CMS has used the same weights for
malpractice premiums.115 Using the same AMA data used in this
article, and numerous other sources, CMS found that premiums had
increased from 3.152 percent of gross practice revenue in 1996 to
3.865 percent of gross practice revenue in 2004.116 This represented
nearly a 17 percent increase in the weight assigned to malpractice
premiums as a factor in physician practice costs. The CMS findings
regarding the relationship between malpractice premiums and gross
practice revenue are displayed in the pie-chart below in Figure 10(a).

113. Medicare Program: Revisions to Payment Policies Under the Physician
Fee Schedule for Calendar Year 2004, 68 Fed. Reg. 63,196, 63,213 (Nov.
7, 2003).
114. Id.
115. See Medicare Program: Proposed Revisions, 72 Fed. Reg. 38,122 (July
12, 2007) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 409, 410, 411, 413, 414, 415,
418, 423, 424, 482, 484, 485 and 491).
116. Medicare Program; Proposed Revisions to Payment Policies Under the
Physician Fee Schedule for Calendar Year 2004, 68 Fed. Reg. 63,196,
63,240 (Nov. 7, 2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 410 and 414).
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Figure 10(a). Allocation of gross practice revenue for physicians nationally,
2004, as determined by Medicare.117

The CMS findings on malpractice premiums were stated as a
percentage of gross practice revenue. Total practice costs were 47
percent of gross revenue. Therefore, CMS found that malpractice
premiums accounted for about 8 percent of total practice costs as is
indicated by the pie-chart below in Figure 10(b).
Figure 10(b). Malpractice premiums as a percentage of total practice
expenses for physicians nationally, 2004.118

117. Medicare Program, 68 Fed. Reg. at 63,240. Chart compiled by the
authors.
118. Id.
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Finally, claims that malpractice premiums make it difficult for
physicians to have a viable medical practice need to be evaluated in
terms of what is known about physician income in relation to the
earnings of other workers in the United States. Physicians remain
among the highest-paid professional groups in the country. Mean
physician net income in 2003 was between the ninety-fifth and ninetyninth percentiles for all Americans.119 As Figure 11 shows, in 2000,
physicians had dramatically higher earnings than not only most
workers but also most professionals, people with doctorates or masters
degrees.120
Figure 11. Mean physician income relative to mean income for all full-time
year round workers and people with professional degrees, doctorates, and
master’s degrees in 2000.
Full Time
Workers
All
Physicians

Physicians

Professional
Degrees

Ph.D.

Master’s
Degrees

$260,287

Men

$59,884

$135,501

$104,039

$88,123

Women

$39,701

$69,126

$60,523

$51,705

Sources: Full Time Worker Income from U.S. Census Bureau, Table P-37
Full-Time Year-Round All Workers by Mean Income and Sex: 1955-2013;121
Physician income from AMA Surveys; Professional Degree, Doctorate, and
Master’s Degree income from U.S. Census Bureau, Table P-18 Educational
Attainment—People 25 years Old and Over by Mean Income and Sex: 19912013.
Note: Data adjusted by the CPI and expressed in constant 2005 dollars.

119. See David Cay Johnston, Richest Are Leaving Even the Rich far
TIMES,
June
5,
2005,
Behind,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/05/national/class/HYPERFINAL.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& (citing chart titled “The
Wealthiest Benefit More from Tax Cuts”).
120. AMA data on physicians do not provide separate income data for
women and men physicians. The Census data on earnings used above
provide separate income data for women and men and no average for all
individuals in these categories.
121. Figures for all other occupations are derived from Historical Income
Tables:
People,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/people/ (last
updated Sept. 16, 2014).
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To paraphrase Mark Twain’s well-known response to finding his
obituary prematurely published in a newspaper: The reported recent
demise of medical practice as a result of rising malpractice premiums
has been greatly exaggerated.

IV. Do Some States Have a Premium Crisis?
Some states have enacted legislation capping the amount of
damage awards. Consequently, premiums in these states might be
lower than those without caps. Thus despite offering compelling
evidence against claims of a premium crisis on a national and regional
basis, the AMA surveys may not be able to reveal a crisis for
particular states if these crises occur in states without caps on awards.
Several states place caps on the total award; however, most states
that do cap awards typically limit payment for pain and suffering or
punitive damages, rather than for loss of income or out-of-pocket
expenses. As of October 2005, eleven states had laws capping damage
awards for non-economic damages at $250,000; ten states had
legislation that capped awards at between $250,001 and $499,999;
thirteen states had legislation limiting non-economic damages at
$500,000 or higher; and eighteen jurisdictions did not have any limits
on damage awards.122
Some studies suggest, however, that the difference in premiums
between states with award caps and those without them is slight. In
2003, the Government Accountability Office reviewed studies on the
effect of statutory caps on premiums. The GAO concluded that there
is disagreement as to whether caps on damages lead to lower
premiums and that “a lack of comprehensive data on losses at the

122. States that capped damage awards for non-economic damages: At
$250,000 (AL, AR, CA, CO, ID, IN, KS, ME, MT, NC, TX); caps
between $250,001 and $499,999 (AK, GA, HI, MI, MO, NV, NJ, OK,
SC, UT); caps at $500,000 or higher (FL, IL, LA, MD, MA, MS, NE,
NM, ND, OH, SD, VA, WV); jurisdictions without caps (AL, AZ, CT,
DE, IA, KY, MN, NH, NY, OR, PA, RI, TN, VT, WA, WI, WY and
Washington, D.C.). See Liability: Limits on Damage Awards, AM.
ACAD. OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS (Oct.
2005),
available
at
http://www.aafp.org/dam/AAFP/documents/advocacy/legal/liability/
ES-LiabilityDamage-1005.pdf. See also Medical Liability/Medical
Malpractice
Laws,
NAT’L
CONF.
ON
ST.
LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/medicalliability-medical-malpractice-laws.aspx (last updated Aug. 15, 2011).
Fourteen jurisdictions do not have a damage award limit or cap, thirtyeight jurisdictions have a limit or cap. Connecticut and Minnesota allow
for a court to review of the damage awarded, but does not specify a
specific limit or cap.
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insurance company level makes measuring the precise impact of [state
caps] impossible.”123
In 2004, Kenneth Thorpe studied how award caps affect
premiums. He estimated that in the twenty-five states with caps on
damage awards, “premium[s] per physician . . . were associated with a
12 percent reduction in premiums” compared to non-cap states.124 In
other words, averaging premiums in states with caps and premiums in
states without caps for yielded a 12 percent difference in premiums
among the two groups of states. Even if we accept Thorpe’s
conclusion and assume that premiums are 6 percent higher in states
with caps than the AMA data indicate (because it averages between
states with and without caps), premiums in these states would still be
a very small percentage of total practice expenses. They simply would
not be large enough to substantially affect net practice income. Using
Thorpe’s 12 percent finding, for example, premiums still constituted
only 2 percent of total practice expenses in 2000. If the reported mean
dollar values for premiums for physicians nationally are increased by 6
percent with other expenses and revenue remaining constant,
premiums would be 8 percent of total expenses, net income reduced
by $1,252.
The Thorpe study, however, averaged premiums across twentyfive states with caps on awards. This may hide premium differences
among the individual states averaged, still allowing for the possibility
of state-specific crises.
A recent study led by David Hyman on the effect of caps on noneconomic damages in Texas found that the effect of caps is less than
supposed because damage awards often are reduced to the lower
limits of individual liability insurance coverage.125 Expressed in 1988
dollars, the cap in Texas reduced the mean payout in cases with jury
verdicts by $184,000, from $696,000 to $512,000.126 Predicted payouts
in settled cases declined by $56,000, from $313,000 to $257,000.127
Nonetheless, the only way to be certain that no state specific
premium crises exist is to obtain reliable data from every state.
Although no such data exists, there is a worthy alternative: Reliable
data from a state that by all accounts should have a premium crisis if
such a crisis exists.
123. GAO REPORT, supra note 51, at 42.
124. Thorpe, supra note 96, at W 4-26-27.
125. David A. Hyman, et al., Estimating the Effect of Damages Caps in
Medical Malpractice Cases: Evidence From Texas, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
356, 400 (2009).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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A.

Massachusetts as a Test Case

Based on all available information, if there are states with a
premium crisis, Massachusetts should be among them. The AMA
itself declared Massachusetts a “crisis state.”128 Why? Because
Massachusetts has a soft $500,000 settlement cap that allows broad
exceptions and that is “woefully inadequate,” according to the
Massachusetts Medical Society, another organization claiming a
national premium crisis.129
“The AMA is disheartened that the medical liability environment
in Massachusetts has deteriorated to the point where physicians are
restricting services, and patients are losing access to care,” said the
AMA’s Palmisano in 2004.130 The situation outside of Boston is
particularly worrisome.”131 Added Alan Woodward, then president of
the Massachusetts Medical Society: “Our patients have world-class
physicians and health care institutions, but this crisis has been
steadily eroding the quality of our health care system for many
years.”132
Stoking the panic are data from the National Practitioner Data
Bank (NPDB). These data indicate that, from 2000 to 2005,
Massachusetts should have had higher premiums than most states
because of its high malpractice settlement payments. Malpractice
premiums reflect the size of malpractice awards and their frequency.
The Massachusetts median settlement payment of $187,000 ranked
fourth, and its mean settlement payment of $329,000 ranked sixth for
all jurisdictions nationally.133 At 4.34 payments per 100,000 people,
the state is ranked 24th in the frequency of awards nationally, but

128. MASS. MED. SOC., ADDING VALUE, MAKING A DIFFERENCE – 2004
ANNUAL REPORT 6-7 (2004) http://www.massmed.org/about/mms-2004annual-report-(pdf).
129. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 60H (2000); Mass. Med. Soc’y, Background:
Massachusetts Medical Liability Crisis (June 14, 2004) (on file with the
author).
130. Massachusetts Becomes 20th State in a Medical Liability Crisis, PR
NEWSWIRE (June 14, 2004), http://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/massachusetts-becomes-20th-state-in-a-medical-liability-crisis74960777.html.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN.,
NATIONAL PRACTIONER DATA BANK – 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 72 (2005)
http://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/resources/reports/2005NPDBAnnualReport.
pdf.
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had less than one fewer payment per 100,000 than the ninth highest
state.134
Only Washington D.C. and Connecticut had both higher mean
payment sizes and frequency. Since Massachusetts malpractice
payments were among the highest nationally, its premiums should
also be high compared to other states. Not the case. In Massachusetts,
mean premiums were lower in 2005 than in 1990 for nearly all
physicians.
B.

The Massachusetts Study Data

Our study of Massachusetts premiums (the Massachusetts Study)
used data from the state regulated mutual insurer, the Medical
Professional Mutual Insurance Company, known as ProMutual Group
(PMG), which since 1975, has been the state’s main medical
malpractice insurer.135 Its insurance rates reflect prices available to
most physicians.
In 1975, as a result of the exit of commercial malpractice insurers
from Massachusetts, the legislature created the Massachusetts
Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association (MMJUA). The
legislature converted it into the Massachusetts Medical Professional
Insurance Association in 1993 and then in 1995 to ProMutual. Around
the time of the formation of the MMJUA, Harvard affiliated hospitals
created the Controlled Risk Insurance Company (CRICO) for its
affiliated physicians.
Since their creation in the late 1970s, the MMJUA/ProMutual
and CRICO controlled about 90 percent of the physicians’ liability
insurance market, each covering about half that market.136 In 2005,
A.M. Best (a U.S.-based rating agency focused on the insurance
industry) reported that the ProMutual Group covered 77 percent of
regulated professional liability insurance, which includes other medical
professionals and health care institutions. Those physicians that did
not purchase insurance from the ProMutual Group or CRICO
purchased insurance from other state regulated insurers or from
unregulated risk-retention groups and offshore insurers.

134. Id. Calculations based on National Practitioner Data Bank. Data
adjusted by state population from U.S. Census data for 2001-2004.
135. The author had restricted access to the raw data used to compile the
figures in this section. As a result of this restriction, the Editor was
unable to review the raw data before going to print.
136. See Johnston, surpa note 119 (citing the chart “The Wealthiest Benefit
More from Recent Tax Cuts”).
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C.

How Insurers Set Premiums

To understand changes in the cost of professional liability
insurance, it helps to consider the various kinds of liability insurance
available. Insurers sell several types of policies, each priced differently.
Policies vary based on the time period covered and the dollar amount
of liability coverage. Insurers set premiums based on three key
variables: (1) risk of loss (which can vary with practice specialty and
other factors), (2) the dollar amount of protection, and (3) the time
period covered.137
Insurers calculate each practice specialty’s risk of loss and assign
it to a premium rate group.138 Once insurers assign each practice
specialty to a rate group, they can refine their risk assessment based
on many other factors including the physician’s claims history, length
of time in medical practice, their work setting, and organizational
affiliation.139
Policies specify a maximum amount that can be reimbursed both
per claim and yearly for all claims. Massachusetts initially required
that physicians purchase at least $100,000 of loss coverage per claim
with coverage capped at a $300,000 yearly loss.140 Starting in 1987,
the Massachusetts Board of Registration required physicians to
purchase up to $100,000 coverage per claim, capped at a $300,000
yearly loss.141 In 2006, $1/$3 million coverage was the most frequently
purchased amount of liability protection, and $2/$6 million coverage
was the second most frequent level of protection purchased.142
Patients often do not file claims in the same year that the
incident occurred, though statutes of limitation restrict the time that
patients have to file. Professional liability insurance policies cover
either periods when alleged negligence occurs, regardless of when

137. SLOAN & CHEPKE, supra note 12, at 5-15, 34-36.
138. ProMutual Group had eight rate groups in 1975. As it obtained more
information, PMG refined its risk analysis. It used fifteen rate groups by
1990 and nineteen by 2005.
139. In 1990, PMG began to selectively discount rates within practicespecialty rate groups based on these and other factors. In 2000, PMG
increased the frequency and size of its discounts and occasionally
imposed surcharges on physicians it deemed high-risks.
140. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 2.07 (16) (1987).
141. 243 C.M.R. §2.07(16).
142. States vary on whether they require physicians to purchase liability
insurance, and if so, what amount. However, even if states do not
mandate that physicians must purchase a minimum dollar amount of
liability insurance, often hospitals require that physicians do as a
condition for granting physicians privileges to practice in the hospital.
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claims are filed (occurrence policies), or periods during which patients
file negligence claims (claims-made policies).
Physicians renewing a claims-made policy are covered from the
first year that they owned the policy. Premiums are higher for claimsmade policies in the second, third, and fourth years because the
policies cover a longer time. Insurers also sell mature claims-made
policies that cover five or more years of past practice.
Occurrence policies are more expensive than first through fourth
year claims-made policies and less than mature claims-made policies.
The cost of insurance through claims-made and occurrence policies
generally converge over time because physicians who do not renew a
claims-made policy need to purchase “tail insurance” for claims filed
later.
D.

Grouping Physicians into Five Practice Tiers

The Massachusetts study focused on $1/$3 million and $2/$6
million occurrence policies because together, these two types
accounted for 81.2 percent of the policies in 2005. Occurrence policies
are the second most expensive type of policy. Mature claims-made
policies, which are slightly more expensive than occurrence policies,
comprised 10.7 percent of all policies.
In 2005, 54.6 percent of PMG’s policies were for $1/$3 million
occurrence and 26.6 percent were for $2/$6 million occurrence. Nearly
66 percent of PMG’s occurrence policies were for $1/$3 million
coverage, 30.3 percent were for $2/$6 million; only 1.6 percent
provided greater coverage. In 2005, 67.4 percent of all PMG’s policies
were for $1/$3 million coverage and 30.3 percent were for $2/$6
million coverage.
While the raw data provided information on each rate group,
policy type, and dollar amount of coverage, reviewing the information
for nineteen rate groups, six policy durations, and several levels of
dollar coverage is much too cumbersome. Further, the data showed
only small differences in premiums among the rate groups. To clarify
the main trends, the Massachusetts study divided the nineteen rate
groups into five tiers. The 2005 practice specialties in each tier and
percentage of physicians in each tier are listed below, starting with
the most expensive tier and descending to the least expensive tier:
Tier 1. Four percent of physicians: OB/GYN, neurological
surgery, and orthopedists performing spinal surgery.
Tier 2. Four percent of physicians: Major vascular,
cardiovascular, head and neck, traumatic, and orthopedic
(except spinal) surgery.
Tier 3. Five percent of physicians: Major general, abdominal,
thoracic, plastic, cardiac and gynecological or hand surgery,
and emergency medicine without major surgery.
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Tier 4. Eight percent of physicians: Anesthesiology and major
surgery for emergency medicine, ronco-esophagology, colon and
rectal, endocrinology, gastroenterology, geriatrics, neoplastic,
nephrology, laryngology, otology, orhinolaryngology, rhinology,
and urology.
Tier 5. Seventy-eight percent of physicians: All other
physicians, which includes sixty-five practice specialties.

The Massachusetts study supplied the most detailed data on
malpractice premiums available. It reported:
State regulated insurance manual rates for each practice
specialty;
Rate differences for six types of policies with varying duration
of coverage;
Rate differences based on the maximum dollar amount of
liability protection;
Discounts and surcharges to insurance manual rates that
accurately reflect the actual amount that physicians pay;
The percentage of physicians purchasing policies with various
dollar limits on coverage and duration of coverage from 1990 to
2005. This shows changes in what kind of insurance physicians
purchase, not just price changes for fixed coverage; and
Long-term trends and short-term change from 1975 to 2005.
ProMutual Group raised rates 5 percent in 2006, while in 2007
it did not increase rates, but instead decreased them for some
high-risk specialties.
E.

30-Year Manual Rate Trends for the Five Practice Tiers

Figure 12 displays as a line graph the $1/$3 million occurrence
manual rates from 1975 to 2005. Figure 13 displays the numerical
values. These figures indicate the mean tier rates by averaging the
rates of each practice specialty group within each tier. This does not
account for differences in the number of physicians within different
rate groups. That information will be provided later, but it will only
include data from 1990 and later because ProMutual Group did not
have such data prior to that time.
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Figure 12. Massachusetts mean insurance manual premium rates for $1/$3
million coverage occurrence policies for all physicians and physicians divided
into five tiers, adjusted by number of rate groups in each tier; 1975-2005.

Source: Medical Professional Insurance Co.
Notes: All data adjusted by CPI and expressed in constant 2005 dollar. All
percentages of physicians are for 2005. Practice specialties were divided into
tiers charged similar rates.
Figure 13. Massachusetts mean manual premium rates for all physicians and
physicians divided into five tiers for $1/$3 million coverage occurrence policies
unadjusted by count, 1975-2005.

According to the data, mean insurance manual rates for all
physicians grew only slightly over 30 years with rise and fall cycles.
Mean rates increased from $7,095 in 1975, then declined to $5,811 in
1980 and then rose again to $19,855 in 1990. Rates then declined to
$13,955 in 1995 before rising to $21,245 in 2005. The five tiers showed
similar trends with the exception of Tier 1, which included practice
specialties with the highest risk of liability and premiums.
Tier 5, which included 78 percent of physicians in 2005,
experienced smaller rises and declines in the premium cycle than the
mean for all physicians. Tier 5 rates rose from $3,870 in 1975 to their
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30-year high of $12,165 in 2005. Tier 5 rates were $10,056 in 1990, its
second highest year, up from $2,990 in 1980, its lowest year. Tier 4
rates stayed only slightly higher than the mean for all physicians.
Tiers 1 through 3 rates were much higher than for most
physicians, especially in their peak years. Tier 3 and 2 rates soared
from 1980 to 1990, declined until 1995 or 2000 and increased
thereafter. In 2005, however, they were lower than in 1990. Between
1990 and 2005, Tier 2 and Tier 3 rates declined by more than $10,583
and $5,326, respectively.
Only Tier 1 rates ended much higher in 2005 than in 1990.
Although they declined from 1990 to 1995, between 1990 and 2005 the
mean rate increased by $22,392 to $89,319.
These data reveal that something atypical is occurring for
premiums of physicians practicing obstetrics, neurological, and spinal
surgery. Their premiums are much higher than all other practice
specialties. If there is any crisis in premiums, then it is for these
practice specialties, which represent only 4 percent of practicing
physicians. The data indicate that these practice specialties have
atypically high premiums.
The key reason that premiums are higher for these practice
specialties is that the kind of injuries occurring due to negligence can
be much more harmful than in other areas. Although giving birth is
relatively routine and safe for most women and their children, a small
percentage of infants may be deprived of oxygen during birth, for
example, and suffer catastrophic injuries. This can result in the infant
surviving, but also requiring custodial care for the remainder of his or
her life. Similarly, neurological surgery involving the spine may result
in injuries leading to paralysis if the surgery goes awry. This too could
require life-long care.
F.

Distribution of Physicians by Dollar Amount of Insurance Manual
Rates 1990 to 2005

Another way to analyze the price of liability insurance is to report
the percentage of physicians charged different rates, separated by
$10,000 increments. PMG began keeping this data in 1990. Figure 14
shows the distribution of physicians charged different manual rates
per $10,000 increments from 1990 to 2005.
Between 1990 and 2005, physicians with rates under $20,000
increased from 72 percent to 78 percent. Within this group, physicians
moved into higher premium levels. Physicians with high premiums—
more than $60,000—decreased from 8 percent to 4 percent. Physicians
with premiums above $70,000 increased from zero to 4 percent. Those
in the middle range—$20,000 to $60,000—decreased from 20 percent
to 17 percent. Within the group as a whole, physicians moved to the
middle. In 2005, 29 percent of physicians with $1/$3 million
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occurrence coverage had premiums under $10,000; 78 percent had
premiums under $20,000; and 92 percent had premiums under
$40,000. Only 4 percent of physicians had premiums above $50,000.
In 2005, 23 percent of physicians with $2/$6 million coverage had
rates under $10,000; 63 percent had rates under $20,000, and 95
percent had rates under $40,000. Only 5 percent of physicians
received rates above $40,000, only 1 percent more than $60,000. From
1990 to 2005, the highest rate group shrank while the lowest rate
group expanded.
Figure 14. Distribution of physicians by dollar amount of manual premium
rates, prior to discounts and surcharges, for occurrence policies of $1/$3
million and $2/$6 million coverage, 1990-2005.
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G.

Adjusting Mean Manual Rates for the Number of Physicians in
Each Rate Group

The previous statistics for the five tiers were computed by
averaging the rates of each group. Some rate groups, however, have
many more physicians than others. A more accurate measure of
central tendency would take account of this by weighing the average
with the number of physicians in each rate group. Figure 15 displays
mean premiums since 1990 for each tier weighed by the number of
physicians in each rate group. Again, PMG only has data on the
number of physicians in each rate group since 1990.
Figure 15. Mean manual premiums for five physician tiers weighted by the
number of physicians in each rate group for $1/$3 million and $2/$6 million
occurrence policies, 1990-2005 including percentage of physicians in each tier,
1990-2005.
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Source: Medical Professional Mutual Insurance Co.
Note: All data adjusted by CPI and expressed in constant 2005 dollars.
Practice specialties divided into tiers charged similar rates.

Between 1990 and 2005, mean premiums for all physicians
purchasing $1/$3 million occurrence policies decreased from $17,907
to $17,810. As noted previously, mean premiums for physicians
collectively were not at an all-time high in 2005—the peak year was
1990. Premiums fell thereafter until 2000 before rising again to the
amount charged in 2005.
Mean premiums in Tiers 5 and 4 also cycled down and up and
ultimately rose just over $1,250 and $1,040, respectively, from 1990 to
2005. Rates for Tiers 1 through 3 were much higher than for most
physicians, especially at their peaks. Tier 2 and Tier 3 rates declined
until 1995 or 2000 and increased thereafter. Still, in 2005, those rates
were lower than in 1990. Tier 2 and Tier 3 premiums declined by
more than $5,375 and $7,526, respectively, between 1990 and 2005
and ended at $44,289 and $36,557. Only Tier 1 premiums were much
higher in 2005 than in 1990. Tier 1 premiums increased from $28,825
in 1990 to $95,045 in 2005. Trends are similar for $2/$6 million
coverage, with the exception of Tier 4 premiums which decreased
from 1990 to 2005.
To summarize, these data support the previous findings: Premium
rates for most physicians were not high and, in fact, declined from
1990 to 2005. However, physicians practicing obstetrics, neurological,
or spinal surgery are the exception; they paid much higher premiums
than all other physicians and their mean rates increased from 1990 to
2005.
H.

Relation of Reported Premiums to Premiums of Other Policies

How do the premiums for the $1/$3 million and $2/$6 million
occurrence policies just analyzed differ from the premiums of other
policies?
Figure 16 shows 2005 premiums for PMG’s 19 rate groups under
$1/$3 million coverage and the percentage of physicians purchasing
such policies from 1990 to 2005. Occurrence policies in 2005 cost
$3,473 more than first-year claims-made coverage for rate group 1 and
$65,740 more for rate group 19. Comparing mature claims-made
premiums to occurrence policies, the former were $375 more than in
rate group 1 and $7,763 more in rate group 19.
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Figure 16. 2005 manual premium rates in dollars for first-year claims-made—
mature claims-made policies and occurrence policies for $1/$3 million coverage.
percentage distribution of physicians purchasing occurrence policies by rate
group, 1990-2005.

Source: Medical Professional Mutual Insurance Co.
Note: All data adjusted by CPI and expressed in constant 2005 dollars.

I.

How Manual Rate Discounts and Surcharges Affect the Premiums
Physicians Pay

After 1990, insurance manual rates became a less reliable measure
of the amounts that physicians paid for insurance because PMG
began to discount or surcharge rates. Initially, PMG discounted
premiums for only some physicians. Around 2000 it increased the size
and frequency of these discounts and started to impose rate
surcharges for some high-risk physicians—nearly all physicians who
were not high-risk received some discount, frequently around 5
percent, but some received much larger discounts than others. By
2000, however, PMG began increasing discount frequency and size as
well as surcharging physicians.
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In 2005, PMG discounted 88.7 percent of policies.143 Sixty-five
percent of physicians received discounts between zero and 25 percent
while 23.6 percent received discounts between 25 percent and 50
percent. PMG also surcharged rates for 6 percent of physicians. Fourand-a-half percent of physicians paid surcharges under 25 percent and
1.4 percent paid surcharges above 25 percent. Adjusting the Tier 1
premiums for discounts and surcharges, physicians paying more than
$70,000 fell from 4 percent to 2.7 percent; 1.1 percent paid $60,000 to
70,000, and 0.1 percent paid $50,000 to $60,000.
In 2005, 66.7 percent of all $1/$3 million occurrence policies were
discounted by more than 12 percent. Reducing 2005 rates by just over
12 percent for Tier 5, and by only 5 percent for Tier 4, resulted in
lower premiums than in 1990. Consequently, premiums for most
physicians in Tiers 4 and 5 were lower in 2005 than in 1990. Mean
rates for Tiers 2 and 3 were lower in 2005 than in 1990 even before
adjusting for discounts and surcharges. Tier 1, however, continued to
be the exception, having a higher mean premium in 2005 than in 1990
even after adjusting for its mean discount of $11,014.
As the above analysis makes clear, after adjusting for discounts,
nearly all physicians in Tiers 2, 3, and 4 paid lower premiums in 2005
than they did in 1990. So, if premiums were actually a burden on
practice income, they were a greater problem in 1990 than at any
point between 1990 and 2005.
But what about Tier 1 physicians? Could they have experienced a
premium crisis?

143. PMG discounted rates in 2005 as follows:


Interns, residents, and fellows working in a facility insured by
PMG: 25% or 15%;



Physicians in first and second year practice: 50% and 25%;



Physicians in academic settings or community service treating
patients 21 hours a week or less: 50%;



Emergency medicine physicians: up to 20%;



Physicians covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act: between 25%
and 50%; and



PMG reduced premiums additionally up to 25% for physicians
deemed low-risk and surcharged physicians deemed high-risk up to
25%. Physicians with no closed claims over $10,000 received
discounts between 3% and 15%, based on the duration of clean
claims. Group practices with a favorable claims history also
received discounts.
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J.

Obstetrics and Other Tier 1 Practice Specialties

Figures 17 and 18 reveal premium variations in Tier 1. Figure 17
displays dollar values for each of the Tier 1 practice specialties’ mean
and median manual rates, mean premiums adjusted by discounts and
surcharges, and the lowest and highest premiums paid in 2000 and
2005. Figure 18 displays the percentage of physicians who received
discounts in each of Tier 1’s specialties in 2000 and 2005.
According to the data, premiums for Tier 1 physicians with $1/$3
million coverage varied widely in 2005. The OB/GYN manual rate
was $97,243, about $8,700 more than its 1990 level. Depending on
rate-adjustment, however, OB/GYN premiums ranged from $48,622
to $145,865. Few Tier 1 physicians purchased $2/$6 million coverage
in 2005. But nearly all OB/GYNs with $2/$6 million coverage paid
the insurance manual rate with more paying surcharges than receiving
discounts.
Since 1990, the highest rates were for OB/GYNs. To examine
OB/GYN premiums in more detail, the Massachusetts study
supplemented OB/GYN occurrence data with claims-made data.
Figure 19 displays insurance manual rates, mean premiums adjusted
by discounts and surcharges, the lowest and highest premiums paid,
and the percentage of physicians who paid these rates for all $1/$3
million occurrence policies in 2000 and 2005. The data for $2/$6
occurrence was not reported since only 20 policies for this coverage
were purchased, and that sample size is too small for any meaningful
comparison.
In 2000, OB/GYN occurrence rates were $69,361, about $275
more than 1990 rates. Due to discounts and surcharges, however, 88
percent of OB/GYN’s paid less than in 1990. Claims-made premiums
reveal similar patterns as mean weighted premiums were lower than
in 1990. By 2005, only 3 percent of OB/GYNs with occurrence
policies paid the manual rate of $97,243 and twenty-nine percent paid
less than the 1990 rate. Between 53 percent and 76.2 percent of
OB/GYNs purchasing first year through fourth year claims-made
policies received discounts, yet most paid more than 1990 rates.
Premiums varied greatly: The highest were more than twice the
lowest.
In summary, nearly all of the 97 percent of physicians in Tiers 2
through 5 paid lower premiums in 2005 than in 1990. Concerns that
premiums are higher now than ever before are clearly unfounded.
Only a few selective practice specialties appear to pay higher
premiums. Even so, the premiums of the three practice specialties in
the highest rate tier reveal great variation in premiums paid—some
had substantial premium increases since 1990 while for others,
premiums declined. For OB/GYNs, the practice specialty with the
highest premiums, the most costly year for all physicians was not
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2005. During that year, nearly a third of those physicians paid less
than they did in 1990.
Figure 17. Top three practice specialty manual premium rates and mean,
median, low, and high premiums adjusted for discounts and surcharges for
$1/$3 million and $2/$6 million occurrence policies.

Source: Medical Professional Mutual Insurance Co.
Note: All data adjusted by Consumer Price Index and expressed in constant
2005 dollars.
*Ortho/Spinal: Orthopedics performing spinal surgery;
**OB/GYN includes OB/major surgery.
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Figure 18. Percentage distribution of physicians receiving various discounts
and surcharges in top three practice specialties, for $1/$3 million and $2/$6
million occurrence policies, 2000-2005.

Source: Medical Professional Mutual Insurance Co.
Note: Ortho/Spinal: Orthopedics performing spinal surgery.
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Figure 19. OB/GYN manual rates and mean, low, and high premiums
adjusted for discounts and surcharges, for 2000 and 2005 for $1/$3 million
first year through mature claims-made and occurrence policies, 1990 manual
rates.

Source: Medical Professional Mutual Insurance Co.
Note: All data adjusted by CPI and expressed in constant 2005 dollars.
CM: Claims made.

K.

An Unrecognized Factor Leading to Selective Increases in
Premiums

Premiums did not increase uniformly for high-risk physicians in
the years following 1990; rather, they declined for nearly a third of
physicians and increased substantially for most of the others. There is
another factor not generally recognized that explains this phenomena:
changes in medical underwriting. After 1990, PMG extended
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underwriting within practice specialties through premium discounts
and surcharges based on individual risk factors. It reduced premiums
for lower risk physicians and increased them for those with higher
risks.
Physicians within Tier 1 paid identical premiums in 1990; by
2005, however, their premiums varied three-fold. In 2005, nearly onethird of OB/GYNs paid less than 1990 rates while 28 percent paid
$28,150 or more than 1990 rates. Refining risk ratings contributed
significantly to the increased premiums for high-risk OB/GYNs, while
it lowered premiums for lower risk OB/GYNs. As a result, the cost of
insurers lowering premiums for some OB/GYNs was a higher
premium for high risk OB/GYNs.
If PMG changed all OB/GYNs the same amount in 2005,
averaging high and low premiums and all discounts and surcharges,
rates would have increased for this specialty by less than $16,900
since 1990.144 By both differentiating risk and charging premiums
according to risk, premiums in 2005 instead varied between $48,621 (a
decrease of $20,465 from 1990) and $145,865 (an increase of $76,780
since 1990). When OB/GYNs seeking lower premiums compelled
insurers to compete for business, PMG lowered premiums for low risk
OB/GYNs. Those low risk OB/GYNs then stopped subsidizing highrisk OB/GYNs. The result? Lower premiums for a few OB/GYNs,
somewhat higher premiums for most, and much higher premiums for a
few. In short, one reason that premiums increased for some
OB/GYNs, is that insurers sought to price individual policies based
on assessed risk rather than to spread that risk across all OB/ GYNs
as a group.
In 2005, 21 percent of OB/GYNs paid rate surcharges. Eight
percent paid a 10 percent surcharge, 7 percent paid a 20 percent
surcharge, 3 percent paid a 30 percent surcharge, and 3 percent paid
either a 40 percent or 50 percent surcharge. Furthermore, 76 percent
of OB/GYNs received discounts. Twenty-one percent of OB/GYNs
received a 10 percent discount, 26 percent received a 20 percent
discount, 27 percent received a 30 percent discount, and 2 percent
received a 50 percent discount.
Insurers in other markets often employ individual risk rating.
Health insurers that sell individual policies typically use risk rating,
charging steep premiums to high-risk individuals or denying them
coverage altogether. Most people, however, obtain health insurance
through employers, which spreads the risk across all employees and
makes insurance affordable for high-risk individuals. Enterprise
144. This number is obtained by taking the 2005 mean discount-andsurcharge-adjusted premium for $1M/$3M occurrence policies ($85,970)
and subtracting the 1990 manual rate ($69,970) for $1M/$3M
occurrence policies. See Figure 19 supra.
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liability is an equivalent mechanism to pool risk and subsidize highrisk individuals for malpractice insurance. It shifts legal and financial
responsibility from individual physicians to organizations such as
hospitals.
L.

Changes in Policies Purchased

The analysis so far is of pure price increases and decreases for a
constant product, namely insurance policies for a set dollar amount of
coverage. Another reason for rising or decreasing expenditures is that
people may purchase different products. When considering claims that
premium costs are out of control, it is important to define what the
product is that physicians are purchasing and whether the product
has changed.
Car prices, for example, can increase because the manufacturer or
dealers choose to charge more or because the kind of car people
purchase changes over time. Consider cars throughout the last several
decades: They have added features such as air-bag restraint systems,
antilock brakes, catalytic converters to reduce harmful emissions, and
computer chips to manage various functions. Manufacturers also
redesigned engines to make cars more fuel efficient, changed the
design and components to make them safer, and made numerous
other changes in the material used and in the design.
In comparing cars of the past with those of today we need to
consider the reasons for the price change: is it due to specific changes
in the product, or has the price changed despite the product
remaining the same? When purchasing professional liability insurance,
the product is a defined dollar amount of liability protection for a
certain period. Insurers have not significantly changed the
configuration of their policies, and as a result, it is much easier to
gauge pure price increase over time.
Furthermore, physicians may purchase a greater dollar level of
coverage today than in the past, which increases the amount they
pay, even if the price of the policy remains constant. They may
purchase greater coverage because they risk greater liability, or
because they are obliged to do so by state laws or hospitals as a
condition for having practice privileges. They may also purchase
higher dollar amounts of coverage on their own to obtain greater
protection.
It is worth noting that the increased dollar amounts of liability
protection do not cost proportionately more. This is because the
probability of the physician being held liable does not increase based
on the policy purchased. Further, physicians found liable for
malpractice are not usually liable for the maximum amount of their
policy.
Since 1975 the Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine
required physicians to purchase up to $100,000 coverage per claim,
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capped at a $300,000 yearly loss.145 Nevertheless, the most commonly
purchased policy is $1/$3 million. Between 1990 and 2005, many
physicians increased coverage limits and paid more for the new
policies. Figure 20 displays the distribution of all policies by type and
dollar coverage from 1990 to 2005. Physicians purchasing $1/$3
million policies decreased from 71.3 percent to 67.4 percent; those
purchasing $2/$6 million policies jumped from 8.4 percent to 30.3
percent.
Physicians also switched to less expensive policy types. Those
purchasing mature claims-made policies—the most expensive
category—fell from 25.4 percent to 10.7 percent. Physicians
purchasing occurrence policies—the second most expensive type—
increased from 72.6 to 83.2 percent. Physicians with first-year through
fourth-year claims-made policies increased from 2 to 6 percent.
Purchasing less expensive types of policies, however, is different. Since
such changes are based on the duration of time covered, physicians
would need to purchase other policies over that time.

145. 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 2.07 (16) (1987). Many states do not require
physicians to purchase malpractice liability insurance and many states
that do require that they purchase a low level of coverage. See Hyman
et al., supra note 11, at 55.
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Figure 20. Estimate, distribution of polices sold by dollar amount of
coverage and by major types of policy, 1990-2005.

How should we interpret changes in the kind of insurance policies
that physicians purchase, particularly increases in the dollar amount
of liability coverage? When physicians are compelled to purchase
greater amounts of liability protection clearly that is a cost of practice
they cannot avoid. In this case, it makes sense to consider such cost
increases as an increased cost of practice even if the price of insurance
has not increased. We can summarize this by saying that physicians
needed to purchase greater levels of liability coverage to practice
medicine.
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But what about physicians who purchase greater amounts of
liability protection even though they are not required to by state law,
hospital policy, or other rules? If physicians need more protection
because awards are higher and they cannot reasonably practice with
the same amount of coverage as they did previously, it seems
reasonable to take account of that also. If all or most physicians
purchased greater dollar levels of liability protection, then it seems
prudent to assume these physicians generally needed to purchase more
insurance. But if over time only a small percentage of physicians
purchase greater coverage, then it would be unreasonable to assume
physicians need that extra insurance. Instead, their purchases should
be considered as a reflection of their preferences, risk aversion, or
other factors.
M.

Comparison of ProMutual Group Premiums to Premiums of Other
Insurers

As noted, the PMG dominates the Massachusetts Professional
Liability Insurance Market outside of Harvard’s CRICO. Its large size
suggests that the bulk of its policies reflect what most physicians in
the state pay. Still, if PMG’s physicians had lower risk than other
insurers, then its premiums might understate the prices paid by those
other physicians. The evidence, however, suggests that this is
unlikely. Indeed, there are strong grounds to assert that PMG’s
premiums are higher than other insurers, especially for high-risk
physicians.
First, PMG cannot effectively preclude high-risk physicians.
Massachusetts regulations prohibit insurers from refusing any
applicant. It is true that Massachusetts insurers can cede risk and
insurance premiums to a state mandated reinsurance program for any
policy holder they do not wish to cover. The program would then
divide the costs among insurers based on respective market shares.
But ProMutual Group possesses between 88 and 91 percent of the
market and would bear that portion of the cost regardless. Therefore,
even if PMG cedes risk to the state pool, it would save very little
money by doing so. The opposite is true of insurers who have a small
market share. Since its start in 1995, the reinsurance plan included
between zero and 10 percent of insurance sales.
Second, evidence suggests that PMG charges higher premiums
than its competitors for physicians such as OB/GYNs. Two regulated
insurers—Medical Protective and Connecticut Medical Insurance
Company—appear to have developed niche markets by selling
insurance to specialties that they believe are overcharged. In 2005,
Medical Protective set lower rates than PMG: 14 percent, or $5,850,
less for orthopedists and 11 percent, or $11,602, less for OB/GYNs.
Still, the price that physicians actually paid is not publicly known
because insurers do not disclose details about discounts and
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surcharges. Indeed, these insurers may sell insurance selectively to
physicians with lower than normal risk for their practice specialty.
It also appears that some high-risk physicians have declined
insurance from the ProMutual Group to purchase it at a lower price
from other insurers. PMG analyzed Board of Registration of Medicine
data in 1997 and found that OB/GYNs comprised 4 percent of
Massachusetts physicians, the same amount as its policyholders.
Between 2000 and 2005, however, the number of OB/GYNs that
purchased insurance from PMG declined from 242 to 182 for $1/$3
million coverage and from 55 to 20 for $2/$6 million coverage.
Similarly, PMG’s physicians in the top rate group for $1/$3
million occurrence policies decreased from 4.4 percent in 1995 to 3.2
percent in 2005. Tier 1 represented 8 percent of PMG’s physicians in
1990 but only 4 percent in 2005. The percentage of PMG’s business
that included high-risk physicians also decreased as other insurers
sought a niche market for such physicians by offering them lower
premiums. This data suggests that some physicians switched from
ProMutual Group to its competitors to reduce their premiums.
Physicians in PMG’s highest rate group are also likely to pay at
least as much as similar physicians insured by risk-retention groups or
offshore companies. Physicians choose such unregulated insurance to
pay lower premiums. Otherwise, they would be incurring greater risk
by purchasing insurance with lower financial reserves and less state
regulatory protection without receiving any financial advantage.
CRICO also probably charges lower premiums to its physicians
than is available on the open market. If it does not, then Harvard
receives no financial benefit from creating this self-insurance pool, but
it incurs significant administrative burden and financial risk.
N.

What Causes Premiums to Rise or Fall?

Many physicians think that rises in liability insurance premiums
are due to increases in either the number of malpractice lawsuits or
the number and size of court awards and out of court settlements.
That is not an unreasonable inference, but it misses other causes.
Over the long term, premiums must reflect the costs of malpractice
liability that insurance companies pay. However, in the short term,
changes in premiums are more closely related to market competition,
the interest rate earned by insurers on their investments, and insurers’
predictions about risk. Indeed, careful economic analysis reveals that
there are cycles of rises and falls in premiums for all categories of
insurance, which insurance analysts call underwriting cycles.146
Underwriting cycles are partly due to the long delay between
when physicians purchase policies and when insurers incur loss. This
146. Baker, supra note 59, at 396.
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increases uncertainty and complicates accurate pricing of insurance
risk. Market competition induces insurers to lower premiums to
increase their market share until they revise upward predictions of
future liabilities and reserve needs. Insurers then increase premiums
sharply to make up for liabilities incurred several years before based
on more optimistic estimates.
Changes in the investment climate also contribute to underwriting
cycles. As interest rates rise, so does insurer income from reserves.
When interest rates decline, insurer investment income falls.147 When
insurer investment income declines, insurers typically raise premiums.
And when insurer investment income increases, insurers typically
lower premiums to increase their book of business. The result:
underwriting market cycles. In what analysts refer to as hard markets,
insurers carefully select risks, increase reserves, and raise premiums.
During what analysts refer to as soft markets, insurers assume more
risk, decrease reserves, and lower premiums. For instance, studies
have shown that malpractice premiums rose in Texas in the 1980s and
early 2000 because insurers changed long-term loss predictions and
the investment climate soured, not because claims or awards increased
in size or frequency.148

V. Why the Crisis Persists
A.

Physicians Mistakenly Perceive a Crisis

Physicians and casual observers often conclude that there is a
medical malpractice premium crisis because they rely on unreliable
data or misinterpret accurate data. The most frequently reported data
on malpractice premiums comes from the Medical Liability Monitor
Reporter which reports average changes in premiums without
distinguishing between the prices of premiums in different policies due
to the dollar amount of coverage purchased, which of seven categories
of policies are purchased, or the time period for which the physician is
covered.
Most observers focus on the highest risk specialties. They believe
the premiums for obstetricians and one or two other high-risk
specialties represent what all other physicians pay. They do not
understand that these high-risk practice premiums are atypical.
Furthermore, many physicians and observers look at the premium
rates published in the insurance manual, but in fact, insurers typically
discount those rates for most physicians. Physicians also often fail to
adjust for inflation, and therefore they exaggerate any premium
147. Kurt Karl et al., Capital Markets and Insurance Cycles, 4 J. RISK FIN.
40, 40-46 (2003).
148. Black, supra note 88, at 253.
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increases that do exist. They forget to incorporate the periods of time
during which premiums remained about the same or decreased. Thus,
to many physicians, it appears that their premiums increase steadily
when in fact there were cycles of rises and falls.
Furthermore, press reports often dramatize premium increases by
reporting percentage increases rather than changes in the dollar
amount that a physician pays. It sounds more dramatic to report that
a physician’s premium increased 10 percent or 20 percent than to
report that the premiums increased by $2,000 or $4,000, often just a
small fraction of the total premium amount.
The psychology of malpractice also prompts physicians to perceive
a crisis. Being sued is traumatic. Even when courts decide they are
not liable, sparing them financial loss, physicians incur high emotional
costs. The fear of being sued again imposes a psychological toll.149 The
risk of being held liable for negligence challenges the physician’s selfimage and sense of professional competence, and that causes cognitive
dissonance.
It should come as no surprise that many physicians perceive the
risk of liability as a major burden, even when their own premiums are
a small part of their practice’s expense. Fear of malpractice may even
skew physicians’ perception of how much they pay for liability
insurance. When physicians are financially squeezed they might
perceive malpractice premiums to be the culprit. In fact, when a
physician’s income does not grow, fails to keep up with inflation, or
declines altogether, the problem is not usually due to malpractice
premiums; rather, the problem is more typically due to health insurers
that clamp down on the size of physician fees and deny payment for
services that they deem unnecessary. Malpractice premiums can be a
convenient scapegoat for frustrated physicians.150

149. See, e.g., Sara C. Charles, Jeffrey R. Wilbert, & J. Franke, Sued and
Nonsued Physicians’ Self-Reported Reactions to Malpractice
Litigation, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 437, 437 (1985) (discussing whether
reactions reporting are unique to physicians being sued); see Sara C.
Charles, Coping With a Medical Malpractice Suit, 174 W. J. MED. 55,
55 (2001).
150. The risk of liability also helps physicians justify their entrepreneurial
practices that boost their income with little or no benefit to patients.
Physicians often challenge insurers denial of payment by arguing that
they need to perform those tests, exams, and services in order to protect
themselves from malpractice liability. In fact, physicians typically
receive income from performing those tests that have marginal or no
value, while the risk of liability for not preforming them is small and
remote.
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B.

Key Actors Have an Interest in Maintaining the Perception of a
Crisis

A real medical malpractice crisis serves no one’s interest, yet the
perception of a crisis advances the agenda of certain actors. Many of
these actors promote the impression that a premium crisis exists or do
nothing to correct that misperception. Let us review how the AMA,
the tort reform lobby, politicians, the media, and health law and
policy researchers benefit from the perception of a crisis.
Although the AMA is the oldest organization representing
physicians in the United States, its authority and membership has
declined from its peak in the 1950s when it included about 60 percent
of all U.S. physicians. Today less than one-third of practicing
physicians are members, and numerous other physician organizations
have grown to represent the divergent interests of various practice
specialties.151 This presents a problem for the AMA, which needs to
maintain membership support and revenue to survive.
As the AMA searches for ways to convince physicians to become
or remain members, it has focused on the legal reform of medical
liability. Medical malpractice is a consensus issue. The AMA’s call to
protect physicians from liability unites physicians more than any of
its other proposals.
If physicians ceased to perceive medical malpractice as a pressing
problem, that would undercut the value of one of the AMA’s most
visible campaigns. The motivation for physicians to join the
organization would be reduced. It is therefore in the AMA’s interest
to maintain the perception of a medical malpractice crisis. That helps
explain why the AMA cries crisis when malpractice premiums rise but
does not publicize the declines in premiums. It also helps explain why
the AMA opposed the Clinton administration’s enterprise liability
proposal, which would have made hospitals liable for any negligence
of hospital-based physicians. The proposal would have removed
physician liability, ending the AMA’s need to lobby for reform of
medical liability law.
Rallying under the banner of “tort reform,” a segment of
American businesses seek to reduce the legal responsibility of
corporations for harms caused by their economic activities. The
organizations funded to advance this agenda want to restrict the
ability of injured individuals to file lawsuits, restrict juries from
awarding punitive damages, and cap the amount of compensation
151. See generally MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY & MORALS:
PHYSICIANS’ CONFLICTS OF INTEREST (1993) (discussing the AMAs
growth and policies); MARC A. RODWIN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND
THE FUTURE OF MEDICINE: THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, AND JAPAN
(2011).
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that juries can require firms to pay. These organizations also try to
mobilize public opinion through the media, lobby legislators, and
bring lawsuits to change liability rules.
These organizations, however, face a significant obstacle. A large
segment of the public is unsympathetic to the interests of
corporations and empathizes with individuals who are harmed by
corporate action. These organizations therefore try to bolster popular
support for their agenda by building coalitions with physicians seeking
to change medical liability rules. They know that the public is more
sympathetic to doctors than to corporations, and they believe that
they can advance their aims by framing their agenda as reform of
liability law in general rather than only for corporations. The tort
reform lobby benefits when the public believes there is a medical
malpractice premium crisis because crisis—however fabricated—is
more likely to result in broader changes to tort law.
Politicians benefit from the perception of a malpractice crisis
because it creates an easy way for them to garner electoral support
with little political risk. Candidates for office can please most
physicians by giving a speech supporting the reform of medical
liability law whereas taking a stand on physician payment, health
insurance, or other health policy issues are likely to divide physicians
and lose votes. In addition, changes in medical liability law would not
require tax increases or cuts in government programs, making it an
even more attractive political stance. National candidates cannot be
blamed for not producing legislative relief after elections because
ultimately it is the states, not the federal government, that have
jurisdiction over medical malpractice law.
George Bush backed medical malpractice reform in his
presidential bids in 2000 and 2004.152 Barack Obama also spoke in
favor of reform, but used a more nuanced approach. Rather than
support caps on awards, he promoted the use of projects in interested
states to demonstrate the feasibility of alternatives to the litigation to
resolve medical malpractice claims.153 And in response, when Congress
drafted the Affordable Care Act, it included small federal grants to
152. U.S. President George W. Bush, Remarks Following a Discussion on
Medical Liability Reform in Collinsville, Illinois, 10 (Jan 5, 2005),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=CP
D. See also Peter Baker, Bush Campaigns to Curb Lawsuits; President
Says “Junk’” Litigation Is Driving Small-Town Doctors Out of Business,
WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A50603-2005Jan5.html.
153. U.S. President Barack H. Obama, Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress on Health Care Reform, 7 (Sept. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=CP
D.
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support and evaluate demonstration projects in states that were
interested in such experiments.154
Many journalists meanwhile like to write stories on the
malpractice premium crisis because the topic appeals to general
readerships. Editors are more likely to publish reports of a crisis than
reports showing little or no change in premiums or analysis that is
complex and inconclusive. Dry information and complex economic and
social analysis do not make catchy headlines, hook readers, or sell
papers. But reports of a crisis often do.
It is also an easy story to write. Simply report misleading
numbers on rising premiums and sprinkle the text with quotes from
the many physicians who complain about their rates or threaten to
leave practice as a result of high premiums. Armed with a quotation
from a physician stating how premiums affected his practice, reporters
rarely feel they need to check how those premiums affect the
physician’s overall practice costs or income. Nor do many of these
journalists ask whether the physicians would have retired early even if
premiums had not increased, or whether the early retirement was due
to physicians having earned enough money from their practice to
build a sizable nest egg.
Good scholars should not skew their research results. Yet all
policy scholars have a common bias—they believe that what they
study is important. It is to be expected then that policy scholars who
write on medical malpractice portray medical malpractice as a
pressing problem or a crisis. Why else should anyone fund their
research or read their studies? Malpractice researchers often differ in
their assessment of the effect of current policies and the policies they
recommend, but generally maintain that there is a crisis. Because it
benefits those who write about medical malpractice for the
policymakers and the public to believe that there is a malpractice
crisis, we should not expect malpractice researchers to proclaim that
there is not much of a problem. There is just too much incentive to
claim otherwise.

154. See, e.g., Michelle M. Mello et al., Implementing Hospital-based
Communication-and-resolution Programs: Lessons Learned in New York
City, 33 HEALTH AFF. 30, 30 (2014) (providing the results of one
demonstration project with five New York City hospitals).

226

